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THE FOURTH YEAR.

THE fourth year of the War has a character of its own. In the purely military field we have learnt to realise more and more the immense fighting power of Germany. All expectations of a break in German morale, an anti-Nazi revolution, a sudden failure in the supply of petrol or lubricants or rubber or man power, have been exposed as wishful fancies. At the beginning of the year there were 1,400,000 foreign labourers working in Germany; there are now more than 2½ million and the numbers are still rising, without counting the prisoners of war and the vast factory resources of the conquered countries. As for petrol and rubber, it is we who have to face difficulties; the Axis Powers have conquered almost all the sources of rubber and a large part of the sources of petrol. Germany has practically the whole of Europe with its enormous industrial resources at her command, subject only to the bitter unwillingness of her subjects to work for her. A prolonged psychological war is being waged in every occupied country between desperate and almost despairing patriotism on the one side and all the resources of terrorism on the other. Submit, and there is peace, food, and something like security; resist, and there is starvation, torture and the exaction of "a thousand lives for one life." No wonder the Vichy propagandists keep crying that it is only the madness of England that causes the misery of Europe!

The fortunes of war in the meantime swing to and fro. One sometimes imagines that all was going well before December 7th, when Japan struck her first blow; but it was not so. An official estimate of shipping losses in the first half of 1941 made the total of ships sunk by enemy action greater in "almost every month" than possible British replacements by building, and "in some months four or five times as great." This state of things was successfully coped with by American and Dominion building together with a more extended system of convoys. The same acute danger has recurred this year, and is apparently again being met.

The German advance in Russia was considerably more rapid and extensive in 1941 than it seems to be at present. The defeat of Budenni was more decisive than any Russian defeat this year. Mr. Churchill at that time warned the House that the coming winter afforded no assurance that German pressure on Russia would be relaxed, or the danger of an invasion of England removed; the spring would bring with it heavier fighting than any previously experienced in this war. As a matter of fact, letters captured in the first cold of October began to reveal a slackening of discipline or morale in some German regiments, and November 29th brought the first definite German defeat, the repulse from Rostov, followed by the relief of Moscow and Leningrad.

Our own offensive in Libya, after long preparation, started on November 18th and advanced successfully till January; then Rommel stopped us somewhere beyond Benghazi and later drove us back to Egypt. Everywhere it is the same story: a dashing offensive, successful and suggestive of decisive results, but ultimately staggered and held up. In spite of the theories now fashionable, in all these prolonged operations the defensive proved to have unsuspected strength.

Then came the shock of Pearl Harbour on December 7th, and two

days later the destruction of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* off the eastern coast of Malaya. Of these two disasters the first caused more immediate loss of men and ships, but the second was the more alarming in its significance. The Pearl Harbour surprise was said by some wit at the time to be chiefly a startling proof of the close kindred of the Americans and British, "as lineal descendants of Ethelred the Unready," and the shock it caused throughout the United States awoke the most unready elements of that nation to angry vigilance. But the utter destruction of the best battleship and one of the best cruisers of the British fleet by ordinary Japanese bombers seemed to show that the aeroplane could after all beat the ship, and that the tremendous instrument by which for a hundred years Britannia had ruled the waves had been superseded. The result was catastrophic, Japan had obtained control of the seas and British and American power alike crumbled away before her irresistible onslaught. The Dutch East Indies were of course involved in the crash. There were hopes for a time that by sacrificing some of our strong points others might be saved; which should it be? Hongkong? Singapore? Java? The Philippines? the Burma Road? Rangoon? Some one strong point could surely be rescued from the wreck. But the question was vain: all were defended and all were lost, some with surprising suddenness, like Singapore; some, where defence had been well organised before, like Java and the Philippines, only after long and heroic struggles. There was no lack of courage and endurance in the troops or civil officials. There was general friendliness, and at times devoted loyalty, in the Malayan, Burmese and Javanese populations. But the enemy had command of the sea, and we, who had possessed that privilege so long, now learnt what it was to be deprived of it. Gradually, however, this nightmare of defeat and flight also was checked. To the west the Japanese attacks on Colombo and Trincomalee were repulsed; to the east Australia with American help beat back the attacking air force. Time was gained on the one side for General Wavell to build up a vast Indian army unaffected by Congress intrigues, to receive large reinforcements from home and organise the defence of the eastern frontier; on the other, for the American fleet, in actions of ever-growing importance, to cripple the Japanese naval strength. The Straits of Macassar in January, the Coral Sea in March and May, and the great battle of Midway Island on June 4th and after, were stages in the destruction, by June 22nd, of some 291 Japanese ships, including 1 battleship, 4 aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, 26 destroyers, 27 submarines, 82 transports and 65 cargo vessels. The losses have increased since, notably of destroyers. The enemy's command of the sea is shrinking fast, and seems likely to disappear. Again the same story: crushing offensive, mortal danger, slowing off, halt, and perhaps reverse. We are by no means out of danger, either in Egypt or on the Caucasus front, or in the submarine war of the Atlantic. The next eighty days remain critical.

But meantime, outside the sphere of actual fighting, another movement is in progress, slower but equally momentous. It cannot realise its aim unless the United Nations win the war, but it is all the time making the union of those nations a reality and preparing a common policy and common organs of action in the post-war world. Its aim is quite distinct from mere victory and of longer range.

When the League of Nations movement was started, Sir Edward Grey called attention to its profound significance. It was "not merely a new policy: it was a new method of life." It meant a cessation of international anarchy and an acceptance of the rule of law; a cessation of diplomatic intrigue and an acceptance of co-operation as "good

neighbours"; more difficult still, an agreement by all the law-abiding Powers to condemn war as "a crime against the international community" and to use their combined economic and military strength to prevent it. A few leaders saw this clearly. Lord Cecil insisted immediately that the League must be "All or Nothing." But it will be admitted by everyone who has taken part in the League movement that in no single nation was there a complete understanding of this principle, and in most countries little understanding at all. The countries now anti-League were at first more or less pro-League. Japan and Italy took a leading part on the League Council; it suited their prestige and their immediate interests. Even Germany was by no means averse to the League, or at least to using the League machinery for her own advantage. Other nations, such as the Little Entente, saw the League chiefly as an armed alliance for preventing a resurrection of German and Austrian power; except for some rare spirits, like Masaryk and Benes, their statesmen thought little about co-operation and "good neighbour" policies. They were ready to enforce international law, but not anxious to obey it. Great Britain, on the other hand, was quite ready to obey but could not be bothered to enforce. She was tired, unaggressive, anxious to be let alone; she vaguely hoped that the aggressors did not really mean what they said, and would "simmer down" if treated kindly. The United States had relapsed into isolation, and being perhaps rather ashamed of the way she had deserted the League was inclined, in self-defence, to believe the worst of it.

There was no clear recognition of the issue between Isolation and Co-operation, Law and Anarchy, the belief in war as the necessary *ultima ratio* and the resolute prevention of war as an obsolete monstrosity. It was true, no doubt, that something like President Roosevelt's "ninety per cent. of the human race" wanted to live in peace and were willing, for the sake of peace, to abide by the law; but they were not organised, and were not willing to be organised, to resist the aggressions of the ten per cent. They trusted to isolation, or neutrality, or appeasement. The Kaiser's War of 1914 to 1918 had disturbed them, but had not really taught them the essential lesson. Hitler and Mussolini's War has at last done so.

This issue, if we look straightforwardly at the facts, is what we are fighting about; not about Democracy, not about Liberty, not about Christianity, except in some very derivative sense. When the Axis Powers declared themselves definitely as enemies of the whole League principle, they began gradually to compel the law-abiding ninety per cent. to become its definite supporters. Mussolini was clearer-headed in theory, Hitler more devilish in practice, but their doctrine was the same. Aggressive war was not a crime but a glory; conquest was the test of a nation's greatness. Nations are natural rivals and enemies; the aim of the strong is to subjugate the others. There is no reality beyond the struggle for life, and in that struggle the State—or sometimes the Race—is the unit. All that helps to victory is good; fraud, treachery, terrorism and all forms of inhumanity serve their purpose. Law, justice, mercy, religion, and the like, are ornamental rules of etiquette, useful to the weak and timid, useful sometimes even to the strong for the purpose of deceiving their enemies, but mostly foolish and in times of need positively dangerous.

It is curious how little effect *Mein Kampf* had on its English and American readers. Perhaps we were too much accustomed to thinking that people never mean half what they say, and that foreigners especially are given to vapouring; certainly we shrank from believing things so unpleasant and so likely to involve us in trouble. But deeds

have followed. The hideous persecution of the Jews in Germany, the horrors of the concentration camps, the schools of torture for forming the minds of the young ; then the war itself, the unspeakable oppressions in Poland, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and later in Norway, are seen to be parts of a logical and coherent whole, and have increasingly impressed on all but the slowest minds the inevitability of the issue : these things or the utter denial of these things ; Hell or the rejection of Hell ; Yes or No.

Of course there is still a wide difference between the peoples who have seen with their own eyes, or felt with their own bodies, and those who have only heard stories or read accounts in newspapers. Jews, Poles, and the peoples of east Europe know most : the danger with some of them is that their revulsion against the Hell they have been through may waste itself in revenge instead of building up a permanent protection against such evils in future. The nations that believed in neutrality have learnt their lesson most clearly : Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark. It is worth reading the book of M. Van Kleffens or the recent statement of M. Spaak or of some of those Greeks who flirted so dangerously with Fascism. Isolation would be delightful if it were materially possible, and if civilised men had no consciences. Neutrality would be a great lifting of burdens if neutrality were likely to be respected. But as things are, there is no way of safety, no escape from sufferings more horrible than any inflicted by conquering savages or medieval torturers, except that old way which men thought too idealist, too far removed from the experience of politics and the realities of human nature, too full of Wilsonian fantasies for even President Wilson's countrymen to swallow. Peace is indivisible ; politics are the ethics of nations ; and the only security is organised collective security.

In Europe there are two small nations, Sweden and Switzerland, whom it has suited Germany to spare for the time being. The sword hangs over their heads and consequently they dare not say much. Otherwise all the European nations seem to speak with one voice : they want close alliance with England, their fleets co-operating, as they co-operate now, with the British fleet, and their air forces with the British air force. Their main anxiety, as far as I can gather, is that after the war Britain shall not desert Europe but, accepting her full responsibilities, remain as the centre of a great union for the disarmament of the Axis and the preservation of peace.

This means that these nations, who were all faithful supporters of the League until, for reasons we need not now discuss, they lost faith in it and took refuge in neutrality or appeasement, have now definitely taken their stand for a renovated and strengthened League, and Great Britain, which before the war vacillated so badly, is now standing firm. To most thoughtful people in this country the League principle, under whatever form it may be embodied, seems the only possible principle for a peaceful and civilised world. But it was, until lately, by no means clear that such a principle would be generally accepted. The U.S.S.R. had at one time a very different panacea for human ills, a world-wide communist revolution. The U.S.A., however much it approved of peace and "good-neighbourliness," was against the League and opposed to "foreign entanglements." The sentiments of Chiang-Kai-Shek were unknown. Hence the momentous doubt : Would it be possible after a victory for those four Great Powers to co-operate sincerely for the maintenance of world peace and economic reconstruction ?

Progressively and with hardly a set-back the answer has been revealing itself. At first came one sign after another of the co-operation of Britain and America. They were not formally allied, but they were in

various ways, as the Prime Minister has said, "tied together." The co-operation was not defined or promised: we could just "let it roll, like the Mississippi." Then came the extraordinary and epoch-making Lease-Lend agreements, an improvisation seemingly made to meet the necessities of a critical moment but carrying implications of economic co-operation first between the U.S.A. and the British Empire, and later between all the United Nations, on a scale unimagined before. Then came the Atlantic Charter—no treaty, no diplomatic document, just a rough statement of certain principles which commended themselves to the two great leaders of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, but one which, if studied carefully, implies a more than Wilsonian conception of the moral government of the world, and the acceptance of an international authority like the League in political matters and far stronger than the League in economics. Would other nations concur in these Anglo-American idealisms? Every one of the United Nations at the Inter-Allied Council of September 24th, 1941, adhered to the Charter, and Russia accepted it with one reservation, which really meant a more active support. Did the Charter really mean what it said, or was it only a pious aspiration? Lord Cranborne, for the British Government, announced on June 2nd, 1942, that the British Government "regards itself as absolutely pledged to carry out all the articles of the Atlantic Charter." Is it possible that the Governments concerned will really carry this out? It seems that they are actually doing so. The Wheat Agreement between Britain, the U.S.A., Canada and the Argentine Republic is in operation. Food and other necessities are already being stored for the immediate relief of liberated Europe after the war. The Conference of the International Labour Office on October 27th, 1941, in New York, already working on post-war problems together with the social and economic sections of the League at Princeton, had special addresses of encouragement from the President of the United States and the Deputy Prime Minister of Great Britain. And meantime, the war itself shows more and more a united effort of all the nations: an American Commander-in-Chief in Australia, an Australian Minister of State in Cairo, British tanks and aeroplanes by the thousand and boots by the million in Russia, armies of British, French, Indian, and South African and Australian troops together in Egypt; harbours and aerodromes treated as common possessions wherever they are needed. And lastly, after co-operation between Britain and the United States has been made as secure for the future as the ever-suspicious American constitution permits, comes the full formal and definite alliance in peace and war for twenty years between Britain and the Soviet Republic. This means not, of course, that the two Great Europeans of the East and West will always agree in ideas; but it means that they know they must agree and mean to agree in action.

The first fundamental condition of a satisfactory Peace, a true League of Nations Peace, is, as far as human foresight can assure it, assured. The four Great Powers of the world accept the same moral and political principles and know that they must agree.

Plenty of dangers remain. The peoples of the occupied countries, for all their fortitude, may find that endurance has a limit. They may become estranged from their own governments and armies who do, and can do, so little to help them in their need. Passions of revenge may break out in Europe which will wreck our sober plans of reconstruction. Social revolutions, of the sort which added the last touch to the misery of many nations after the last war, may do the same after this war. Wild partisans, not knowing the meaning of the words they use, are

clamouring for them even in England. Economic troubles, of a complexity never faced before in history, may produce hardships too acute to wait for the patient scientific measures which are to produce the promised "freedom from want." The re-education of German Youth may prove a task too hard for Germany's well-wishers; nay, what sort of lessons are these years of devilry teaching to our own youth? Soon there will be few people living who can remember what a peaceful world was like, and how decent men and women in normal circumstances were expected to behave. One sometimes thinks of the wolf-babies, like Mowgli, who are first-rate in wolf ways but have never learnt the ways of men.

It is easy to think of other post-war dangers. We may be defeated by them. This second "great War in the West" may, as Mr. Baldwin thought, be the destruction of our Christian civilisation. That civilisation doubtless already shows many weaknesses, mostly weaknesses of the sort commonly associated with democracy. Yet, as a student of history, there are certain facts which stay in my mind: the extraordinary humanity of our social services, the noble spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the political pronouncements of our leading statesmen; the high generosity of our recent proposals to India; the steady unvindictive courage of the great mass of our people; I may add the unpretentious self-sacrifice with which my own friends and neighbours set about their private and public acts of service and the intense interest with which an almost absurd number of unofficial societies devote themselves to plans for the re-education and welfare of both ourselves and our enemies. I cannot easily find in history any parallel to the humanity and unconscious idealism of this civilisation which we have inherited from the efforts of our forefathers. It is a splendid thing and does not deserve to die.

GILBERT MURRAY.

THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE.

THE Russian alliance is an accomplished fact and is to last, for war and for peace, for twenty years. That is the fixed policy of our country. Appeasement of Hitler, whatever arguments there were for it in the past, is now dead—stone dead, and anyone who still pursues it is an enemy of our victory. I do not blame those who thought otherwise. Some of them are still in positions of authority, and we only claim that they should now wholeheartedly accept the national policy and do all they can to make the alliance a real success.

There is no question at all of the warmth with which it has been welcomed by the overwhelming majority of our people. It is now for some ten months that, by invitation of the Ministry of Information, I have been addressing meetings on Russia, sometimes running into thousands, all over the country, literally from Inverness to Cornwall. In all places which have suffered most from enemy bombing—Aberdeen, Sunderland, Hull, Bootle, Coventry or Swansea, and especially along the east or south-east coast—the response is immediate and unqualified. All parties have been represented on my platforms; often the most eloquent tribute to the immense service which the Russian resistance has rendered to us, has come from the Conservative. Scotland, the North, Yorkshire, Lancashire, Midlands and Wales are all at one in this matter (if there is any qualification it is in parts of London), and all demand that the comradeship in arms should be continued by

co-operation in peace. Groups for the study of Russian and of Russia are springing up all over the country.

In no sense is this a matter of party preferences, as is generally shown by the presence of the mayor in the Chair. On the contrary, these are pushed aside as not relevant. I have seen nothing like it in my time, and can only compare it in kind to what my father has told me of the national enthusiasm for Italy at the time of Garibaldi, though in degree and extent what we have now goes much wider and deeper. I am sure that this would be made quite clear if at any time the Government were to go to the country. Above all, it is asked why we were not better informed about the Russian people and army.

Our surprise at this alliance was really quite unnecessary. Once we had fought Russia, in the Crimea—a war of mingled muddle and chivalry. This is the fifth time that the most obvious of common interests has brought us into alliance against a world aggression. In 1935 our present Foreign Secretary, for whose wholehearted co-operation my Soviet friends cannot express themselves as grateful enough, said in Moscow that he saw no conflict of interests between the two States, and this applies as much to Asia as to Europe, as much to the Pacific as to the Atlantic.

Yet this record of the past has as much its warning as its encouragement. Of the four past alliances we lost three, and it is as well to examine the reasons. We lost the alliance with Tsar Paul partly because, in our exchanges of war prisoners with Napoleon, we refused to exchange a Frenchman for a Russian; Napoleon seized on our mistake and sent his prisoners back to Russia loaded with small presents. We lost Paul's son, the impressionable Alexander, at Tilsit, largely because our help promised for the relief of Danzig never arrived. In the last war, when I was living in the Russian front line, as I saw with my own eyes and as all subsequent military records confirm, the Russian regular army was three times pounded to pieces—I can give the figures—before our most chivalrous munition crusade, led by Mr. Lloyd George, could take effect, and by the time that our help reached Russia the regular army was no longer there to use it.

That brings us to the very difficult question of our present military co-operation. In many of the primary essentials the Russian army of to-day is as I saw it in the last war. It is always with desperate back-fighting—especially at night and with the bayonet, where the Russian soldier is always the master—that the Russians meet an invader. They did so even in the great German drive of 1915 into the heart of the country, when often they had no other weapon; and when it was brought to a halt by Russian courage in September, Ludendorff complains that he had won nothing more than a tactical success. Encirclement was as far off as ever. That was the achievement of an army practically threadbare of all supplies. Now Russia has her own factories, her own munitions, her own trained technicians, so necessary to mechanised warfare, and whereas then the wholesale illiteracy alone was enough to impede promotion from the ranks to commissions, the Red Army of to-day has perhaps gone through a longer and more systematic all-round course of education than any other. Yet no one could fairly expect that in fourteen years Stalin would get level with the achievement of German industry. All this has been thoroughly recognised here, and it would be hard to find a parallel for the generosity of our supply at a time of our own utmost embarrassment and past unprecedented obstacles.

But, as no one has better reason to remember out of the last war than myself, alliances are inevitably very delicate things, and perhaps

especially alliances with Russia. I have to recall the time when I so often heard it suggested that England was fighting to the last drop of Russian blood. In the present war, the losses in the Russian line amount to five millions. The Russians are like great impressionable children. There seems no limit to their enthusiasm for those who prove friends in a time of danger or to their sacrifices in a common cause. But for that reason they are peculiarly sensitive to the sacrifices on the other side. They realise, of course, that for months past they have carried the main brunt of the war, and it is now driving them to a point where, whatever the will, achievement may be crippled. The one ally naturally asks eagerly what the other is doing. Private soldiers would ask me this as we crouched together in front of the German line under fire in my night excursions; the idea of a distant friend, who was pressing in on the other side, was their chief source of comfort. One wonders what they would have said if they had heard that anyone in authority here had expressed a hope that Germans and Russians would exterminate each other. Such an idea can only be condemned here, as in Russia, in the words of the Bishop-elect of Winchester, in a speech among the ruins of Coventry, as "incredibly mean."

Extermination. In default of Napoleons, that is the cruel arithmetic of this war, and the Russians in their communiqués are always counting in terms of the wearing-down of the German man-power, which really did not seriously begin till Hitler invaded their country. That is why they are so anxious to hear of offensive allied action in the west. Next year a considerably lesser German force might possibly be enough to hold the Russians, and the difficulties in the west would then be doubled for her allies. If Russia fell out of the war, any definite prospect of victory would have disappeared. It is, of course, only those responsible who can judge of ways and means, but if that should happen, I am sure we should all recognise that there is as much responsibility for not taking risks as for taking them. If there is one man who will have recognised this before any of us, and to whom the issue can be safely left, it is our Prime Minister, and the journey from which he has just safely returned may prove the most vital of all his gallant and daring ventures. In a common effort there cannot be two different time-tables, and it is above all essential that there should be a clear understanding on both sides on this crucial question. It is because the allies have got to win the peace as well as the war, that anything which could lessen the cordiality of the alliance or even awaken old doubts and suspicions takes on a far graver importance.

There are obstacles to the wholeheartedness of the alliance on another side, in which our national ignorance has played a great part. The deadly struggle between Stalin and Trotsky has been the central fact of Soviet political history, but its significance has been entirely missed here by Lefts, Rights and indifferents. Our Lefts have in general failed to see the obvious fact that the two men were political opposites, that Stalin is a statesman of construction at home, that he has restored the dignity of the family and even given some satisfaction to the peasant instinct of property (he is now, step by step, removing restrictions on religion)—in a word, that the whole trend of his period of power has led back from the international to the national. Some of our people even seem to suggest that now that we are friends with Russia we may be expected to imitate all the initial blunders and excesses of the Soviet régime, now long since abandoned in Russia. They would like to take us back to that period between 1918 and 1921 which was Trotsky's Eldorado, but in which Stalin hardly figured at all. This is extraordinarily bad history and extraordinarily bad intelligence. They

defeat their own purpose by affronting our own instincts of common sense and independence. It is not with Trotsky and his "permanent revolution" that we are allied, but with the man who eliminated him, who made Russia capable of defending herself against our common enemy. They are certainly in no position to claim any monopoly of our nation-wide desire to show by action our gratitude to our brave allies.

All these questions are really simple enough ; but we have to be clear about them when we approach that of co-operation with Russia after the war. After the last war we seemed to imagine that both Russia and Germany were permanently out of the reckoning. Consequently we, with France, took a brief for the reconstruction of Europe, though of East European affairs we have been so very ignorant as to be taken by surprise when we found ourselves allied with Russia. Our general plan—though the French went much further with it than we did—was to set up a sort of cardboard structure of small powers, incapable of defending themselves and which we have proved unable to protect. In the outcome, in the summer of 1940, we were left defending our own shores against an enemy everywhere else victorious, with hardly a single ally in the field, but with unlimited commitments to small countries far distant from us. Hitler, when checked in the invasion of Britain, went through this weak structure in a year with a minimum of fighting, much less than it took Napoleon when checked on this side to reach the one real barrier, the frontier of Russia. For the smaller powers, even more than for the larger, there is no permanent pledge of peace otherwise than in a permanent guarantee of Britain, America and Russia. If so, Russian views as to how this is to be achieved will have to be taken into as much account as our own.

I will not follow this out fully into details. The detail is often highly controversial, and must therefore be approached not in a spirit of controversy but by such serious study as we have never attempted. Nor is it even being attempted now. Functions highly important to the alliance are entrusted to persons practically ignorant both of the language and the history concerned. Side by side with this there are numbers of persons who have proved their qualifications but continue to seek fitting war service in vain, for no other visible reason than that they do not happen to have the same friends. Curiously enough, I am myself responsible for Russia on the Committee of the National Register to advise on all appointments involving language qualifications, and I can hardly find that a single reference has been made to it by appointing bodies for advice. We are not so far from the days when none of the diplomatic attachés at our Embassy in Russia could conduct a fluent conversation in Russian. Needless to say, no ordinary business would be conducted on such principles. Our ignorance on these subjects is the weakest part of our national armoury ; and this, taken together with our claim to authority, is the surest way of blundering into new wars. All this demands steady work in the future. All that I will do now, without anticipating future discussion, is to state the position of Russia as I understand it.

Russia passed through a Revolution inevitable in one form or another and accelerated and embittered by the conspicuous failure of her government in a world war. Revolution, in any case, puts a country at the mercy of its neighbours. In Russia's case, it resulted in a surrender of nearly all that she had acquired since Peter the Great. Under Stalin's guidance she has now returned from the international to the national. She used her respite from 1939 to 1941 to recover what she could of the territory lost in 1918, which was in any case incapable of defending itself and otherwise must have fallen to Germany in accordance with

the declared programme of *Mein Kampf*. At home, she has exchanged the "one nation" policy of the Tsars for equal rights and responsibilities of all her nationalities. A friendly and therefore independent Poland or Czechoslovakia is a necessity to her as a barrier against future German aggression, but she will resist the claim of a Polish division with her of White Russia and Ukraine, which nationally are far closer to her than to Poland. The little Baltic States, which are incapable of independent self-defence, were never on the map of Europe as national States till the temporary collapse of Russia in 1918. They are in a sense her gates of defence, and they are a constant object of German ambition. Finnish independence need be no danger to Russia if she is secured against Finland again becoming, as she is now, a spring-board for a German attack on Leningrad.

It is precisely the guarantee of Britain and America against future German aggression that can fairly claim from Russia a liberal joint-settlement of these questions. Britain has already given this guarantee for twenty years, with the promise of its further extension.

Here we have an existing government policy which gives a real hope of permanent peace in Europe. If there is one lesson that comes clearly out of our present trials it is that political or class preferences cannot be allowed to interfere with the future fate of our children and their successors. It is the fighting forces of our united country that have got to help win this war. It was our young folk who saved us from invasion in 1940. They must not be set impossible tasks. Living, as an educationist, in constant contact with the next generation to my own—I happen to be Senior Treasurer of the Students' Union of London University, which means some 13,000 boys and girls—I am constantly hearing of young lives cut short in their prime. And even for those who are spared—in a time when all our ploughshares have been turned into swords—it is impossible for all these young people to plan their own life-work or to offer any real security to those who are to come after them. I see no hope of such security, in a world continually threatened by German aggression, except in the continued co-operation, in peace as in war, between the three principal present allies—each of which, by the way, carries the principle of federation in its title—the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The two last of these were absent from the last settlement. With these must, of course, be associated the Republic of China. And under this guarantee of strength we can seek with far more promise of permanence the satisfaction of the rights of the smaller States.

BERNARD PARES.

FREEDOM FROM WANT.

THE Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. The State is made for man, not man for the State. That is the principle underlying the four freedoms enumerated by President Roosevelt: freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom from fear, and freedom from want. These he regards as the elementary rights of every human being. If they were recognised and sanctioned by every community calling itself civilised, how much happier and more prosperous the world would be! For instance, if freedom of thought and expression became the universal rule, there would be no need to provide safeguards in any Peace Treaty for the protection of minorities. If freedom from fear, in other words equality in the sight of the law,

became a reality, the age-long persecution of the Jews would come to an end. Nor should we be confronted any longer by customs, rules, treaties and legislation designed to discriminate between whites and blacks, or whites and yellows.

Roosevelt's four freedoms apply to individuals. They imply toleration in every sphere of human society, and this in turn means the elimination of any colour bar or inferiority status. In many countries this would be regarded as a revolutionary proposal. In China, it involves the abolition of extra-territoriality; in India, a repudiation of the caste system; in South Africa, a reversal of the native policy; in the Southern States of North America, a new outlook on the Negro problem; and in many other parts of the world a readjustment of the relationships of the white and coloured populations. All legislation designed to maintain the domination of the white over the black, brown or yellow races is based upon fear; the fear of being overtaken and submerged. There is only one way of overcoming this fear: it is to practise the principles of freedom and toleration, reinforced by the rule of law, in order that the more primitive and less cultured peoples may gradually learn to appreciate the administration of justice as the basis of every civilised community. This lesson can only be taught by force of example and the sacrifice of privilege. In future the White Man's burden will be more difficult to carry. He will not be able to rely upon his assumed superiority and prestige; the native inferiority is rapidly disappearing. Japanese victories in the Far East, events in India and Malaya, and the rebirth of Abyssinia have hastened the process.

A French philosopher has told us that adaptation is the secret of existence. It follows that when the war is won, the white races must adapt themselves to the new conditions which will have arisen in almost every quarter of the globe. If they insist upon the recognition of the four freedoms—in other words, upon justice—the psychology of law and order will become firmly rooted in the minds of the native peoples, and the temptation to assert what they consider to be their rights by a resort to violence will have been removed.

The first three freedoms may be described as political; the last, freedom from want, as economic. The former deal with the psychological and social, the latter with material conditions. It is true that in both instances the solution must be evolved through political machinery, because in any economic planning changes can only be introduced through some process of legislation. Hence the necessity of encouraging the establishment of representative and democratic institutions which will enable these changes to be brought about by reforms emanating from the moral impulses of the peoples, not from the decrees of dictators. Freedom from want implies many things. In its narrower sense it is limited to the material things of life: enough to eat, clothes to wear, shelter and warmth; in short, a minimum standard of living. In its broader sense it means even more. If it is true that "man cannot live by bread alone," it will include education and cultural pursuits which should be within the reach of every individual. Let us, however, confine our discussion to the narrower definition, the economic and material problems of life.

By Freedom from Want we mean that everyone has sufficient food to maintain his bodily fitness and health, an adequate supply of clothing, enough fuel to provide for heating, provision for his medical requirements, and a hygienic house or room to live in. These are the main items of expenditure if the spectre of want is to be banished from the home; collectively they are described as the "cost of living."

Freedom from want implies, therefore, a minimum standard of living. We realise there are many standards, and that on account of climatic and other conditions the standards and costs may vary in different countries. For instance, freedom from want may mean one thing in a South Sea island—quite another in a European city. President Roosevelt asks us in effect to guarantee a minimum standard to every individual. Such a guarantee implies at least two things: first, that world production is able to supply the minimum needs of all, and, secondly, that the machinery of distribution is available to ensure that everyone gets at least his minimum share.

No one can doubt that if production was concentrated upon the requirements included in the minimum standard, in other words if priority was given to them over everything else, there would never be any danger of scarcity in any part of the world. Ample reserves and stocks could be accumulated to prevent temporary shortages due to bad harvests or other causes. Transport facilities and rapid communications rule out the possibility of famine or a dearth of fuel. In future it would be unthinkable that several million persons should die in Russia, China or India from want of food and nourishment. Further, the application of science to industry, and especially to agriculture, during the last half-century has increased the food, clothing and housekeeping "potential" enormously, and we are assured by the statisticians that to-day the world is capable of maintaining a population far in excess of the existing one.

There is also the problem of production on an economic basis which cannot be realised unless and until countries are free to produce those things which nature has best fitted them to produce. This, of course, is the old argument for free trade, and it involves the elimination of trade barriers, tariffs and other artificial hindrances to maximum production which in the past have so often cancelled out the natural advantages of certain countries in the production or cultivation of some particular article or commodity.

The same is true of distribution. Although its machinery has been expanded and accelerated, nevertheless it is still clogged by the duties and restrictions which have been imposed by governments in their endeavours to preserve the home markets for their own producers. This they have done not only to lessen unemployment but also to safeguard the existence of those key industries which are absolutely essential to the life of a nation in time of war.

So long as each State is compelled to rely upon its own resources alone to defend itself against an aggressor, trade barriers and high tariffs will remain. Moreover, as in the past, a considerable and ever-increasing portion of the national wealth will be spent in the production of new armaments. War and preparation for war must inevitably reduce enormously the potential wealth of every country, and consequently depress the standards of living.

It follows that freedom from want and freedom from fear, the fear of new wars and blitzes, are bound up together and cannot be separated. Both are dependent upon the elimination of war, which, as we are now beginning to realise, can only be achieved through the establishment of some international authority or World Confederation equipped with machinery for the peaceful settlement of all disputes and a preponderance of force—what President Wilson described as "the major force of mankind"—to hold the would-be aggressor in awe and to maintain the rule of law.

Another implication of freedom from want is the right to work. In spite of the immense strides in the application of science to industry and the production of wealth, it is nevertheless true that man's labour, in whatever sphere it may be, cannot be dispensed with. The scriptural injunctions, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and "If any would not work neither should he eat," are still valid, even in the modern world. On the other hand, no one should be allowed to starve or suffer from want if he is able and willing to work. This means that every able-bodied individual is entitled to employment, not to a dole. Then there are those persons who are prevented by physical or mental infirmities or old age from earning a livelihood. They should be provided for and maintained by the rest of the community. For centuries this principle has been recognised and applied in this country. Poor Law institutions, the relief of the needy and destitute, old-age pensions and compensation for accidents have been provided by Parliament from time to time. But the case of able-bodied persons who find themselves in the ranks of the unemployed requires different treatment, and to secure freedom from want they have a right to demand work, not a subsidy from the State.

It is, however, the function of the State to decide what this work should be. Clearly, it must be something which is going to be of some use and benefit to the community, the construction of a new highway or water supply, a housing or agricultural scheme of development. It may be a manual job for which the unemployed person has never been trained and to which he is unaccustomed, and a clerk or brain-worker who finds himself on the patch may consider this to be a hardship. But unless the Government is going to run everything, it is difficult to see how it can be expected to guarantee every unemployed person a job in his old trade or profession. Hence the necessity of accepting whatever work is available until a vacancy occurs in his former occupation. This hardship would be mitigated, though not entirely overcome, if between the ages of, say, 16 and 20 everyone put in six or twelve months in a labour-training camp where they would be employed on some manual work, as, for instance, the reclamation of waste land, afforestation and other public improvements. I once visited one of these camps in Germany. Young men from every walk of life, rich and poor alike, lived together and were put through a course of manual labour. In the camp they were hardened off, and formed a youthful community engaged upon a useful and patriotic job which would increase the productivity and add to the amenities of their country. It may be objected that this is a new form of conscription, but if spades are substituted for rifles and shovels for Tommy-guns, the world would be a much less dangerous place to live in. Discipline? Certainly, why should it not be as efficient in a labour as in a military training camp? Moreover, if any of these young men in after life found themselves temporarily out of work, they would at least have some knowledge and experience of the kind of employment the Government would be able to offer them. Where does the hardship come in? Probably we should all have been much fitter and more useful citizens if we had spent a few months doing manual labour before we entered our trade, profession or college.

Now, if freedom from want implies the right to work, this freedom has been sadly lacking in our country during the last twenty years. Successive Governments failed to deal with the curse of unemployment. This is one of the two great blots upon the administrations which have

been in power here during this period. The other is that they helped to wreck the League of Nations, and when that happened war became inevitable. There is general agreement that unemployment saps the vitality of any country, and we have not yet succeeded in ridding ourselves of its harmful effects. The peak figure was reached in 1933, when there were 2,900,000 unemployed out of an adult population of about 30 millions—or $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Other countries suffered too. America topped the list with 15 millions. Germany had 6 millions, which helped to put Hitler and the Nazis into the saddle, because he promised to find work for everyone. He found the work and turned Germany into one vast munition factory.

What was the remedy which our Governments applied as a cure for unemployment? Was it to provide useful work? On the contrary, they contented themselves with distributing a dole and called it unemployment benefit, as if anyone or any country could benefit by having several millions of unemployed on its hands, becoming more and more unemployable with every day that passed. Someone who was asked for the definition of an agitator replied that it was derived from two Latin words, *agi*—work, and *tator*—I don't think. That was what the Government said when Mr. Lloyd George proposed a comprehensive plan of public works and improvements to provide work for the unemployed until they could be reabsorbed in industry and commerce.

The opponents of this plan said it would compete with private enterprise. But how could the construction of new roads—*autobahnen*—to accommodate motor traffic compete with private concerns? If such highways had been constructed, the death-roll from motor accidents might not have mounted to 9,000 last year even with the black-out. Slum clearances, water supplies, barriers to prevent encroachment by the sea, reclamation of waste lands and other equally useful propositions benefiting the whole country, what have these to do with private industry except to stimulate the demand for its products which may be necessary to carry out the public works?

The opponents also said it would be too costly. So in twenty years they squandered hundreds of millions on the dole. What was there to show for this huge expenditure? Nothing, absolutely nothing. It all went down the drain. How many new roads, reservoirs and other public amenities we might have had if this sum had been spent usefully and wisely in providing work! It may be said that these improvements would have cost much more. This may be so in some instances, though not all, at any rate not in those cases where the principal cost was the labour bill.

The objection was also raised that a new army of Government employees would be created, and that once a man is employed by the Government he will remain in its service because he thinks he has a soft job. There may be ways, however, of overcoming this obstacle. Suppose, for instance, a man is drawing £2 a week from the dole and that the trade union rate of wages is 10s. a day—these figures are merely given by way of illustration. Let us also suppose that he is employed for, say, four days a week on Government work, leaving him two days to do any other odd jobs which come his way. This would mean that the unemployed man would be no worse off, but he would have given the country a *quid pro quo* for his remuneration, and when a vacancy occurred he would be anxious to go back to his old trade or profession, where he would be able to find full-time employment and earn a higher wage or salary. In these circumstances there would be no inducement

to remain in the employ of the Government when his services could, with greater advantage to himself, be better employed elsewhere, and such an arrangement is unlikely to swell permanently the ranks of public employees. Granted it is only a makeshift, but surely it is a better and in the long run a less costly one than the dole.

It is true that under the Insurance Scheme the employee, the employer and the State contribute to the Insurance Fund and, therefore, the unemployed person is entitled to unemployment benefit. But these contributions could be assessed so as to cover only the period of, say, the first three months when he would be looking for a new job in his own trade. At the end of that period, if he had failed to find one, he would be offered employment by the Government, the insurance benefit would cease, and the whole of his wages or salary would be paid out of funds provided by the State.

We realise that unemployment is a canker which grows and eats into the vitals of the nation. It produces many evils and habits which, once they get a hold of their victim, are difficult to shake off afterwards. But if employment is substituted for the dole, instead of lounging round street corners, becoming soft in body and despondent in mind, the unemployed man would be engaged in a healthy occupation and would be able to keep himself fit. Instead of losing his self-respect and becoming unemployable after several years of enforced idleness, he would be helping to improve the public services of his country, and would be anxious to go back to his old occupation whenever an opportunity occurred.

The right to work, imposing upon the Government the obligation to plan and undertake public works and improvements, would, in effect, establish a minimum wage in private industry. The daily rates of pay fixed for Government employment upon these schemes would be based upon the cost or minimum standard of living. There would then be little or no inducement for persons employed in these enterprises to return to their old trade or profession, unless they were able to earn at least as much as they received from the State. In these circumstances employers and firms who could not afford to pay a minimum wage would go out of business, and their employees would either be taken on by more prosperous and enterprising concerns or, failing this, would be able to find work on a Government scheme until, with a revival of trade, an opportunity occurred of returning to their old occupation.

To sum up, freedom from want implies the right to work, which in turn involves a minimum wage and a minimum standard of living. These would no doubt vary in different countries; but when this freedom has been incorporated in a new declaration of the rights of man and endorsed by the United Nations, the economic security of millions of people will be assured and the haunting fear of want will be banished from their minds.

DAVIES.

THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

WHEN the Japanese carried the war to America's backdoor step and bombed Dutch Harbour on June 3rd, 1942, killing forty-five persons, the eyes of the world were turned for the first time in two hundred years upon the little-known chain of the fogbound Aleutian islands, which swings for eleven hundred miles between Alaska

and Kamchatka, dividing the North Pacific Ocean from the Bering Sea. In 1936, when plant-hunting for the British Museum, I was privileged, by the kind permission of the United States Government, to visit this inaccessible chain on the only vessel which pays the distant islands a regular yearly call, the coastguard cutter, based in summer at Dutch Harbour near Unalaska, one of the first and largest of the Aleutians. There is always a certain fascination about an island, but a string of islands is still more alluring. Most of these groups, however, are found running parallel to the coastline, and none affords such an interesting subject for the anthropologist, the botanist, or the strategist of to-day as the long Aleutian causeway, for it stretches from east to west between two continents, forming stepping-stones by which (as most anthropologists are now agreed) primitive man made his prehistoric "hops" from the old world to the new, though his more civilised method of progress was not a Mitsubishi bomber, but a two-seated skin *baidarka*, and instead of a pilot's Mae West and helmet, he was garbed in what was probably the first waterproof in the world, the kamleika coat and hood, made (by his wife) from the intestines of the seal or sea-otter, artistically trimmed with the feathers of small birds.

Though the more general route of migration for these prehistoric peoples was doubtless across the narrows of the Bering Strait at the northern outlet of the Bering Sea, where the continents are sundered by barely fifty miles, there can be little doubt that the Aleutians also afforded steps for the inter-continental journey, as they still do to-day for the flowers. Dr. Eric Hulten, of Lund University, Sweden, who was the first botanist to make a thorough investigation of the island-flora in 1932, points out that the plants are also travelling, though at a more deliberate rate than man, and apparently in both directions, the islands in the centre of the chain being less fertile in species than those at either end, whilst certain Asiatic plants are to be found only on the island of Attu. On the other hand, purely American types are more common at the Alaskan end of the chain. The islands are the tops of a mountain-range which probably once joined the continents, though now only the tallest peaks protrude above the ocean. They rise some 20,000 feet from the bed of the sea, much as the Himalayas tower from the plains of Northern India, some reaching a height of six or seven thousand feet above sea-level. A few of the islands, particularly at the American end of the chain, are still actively volcanic, such as the interesting Bogoslof, which was first sighted by the Russians in 1796, and of which the coast-guard sailors sing—

Old Noah has our deep respect,
And yet he was not quite correct,
Instead of Ararat you know
He should have touched on Bogoslof!

This island is still in a highly unstable condition, and one of the varied duties of the Bering Sea Coastguard Patrol is to keep this erratic bit of American soil under observation. The portion buried by the waves is estimated to be about the size of Vesuvius and the rest to have been cast up from the waters in an eruption.

Attu is the western termination of the American-owned islands, and is only 580 miles from Petropavlovsk, the harbour in Kamchatka (Avacha) from which Vitus Bering and his brave companions set out in 1741, in obedience to the last orders of Czar Peter the Great, to discover "whether there is any continent or island between Kamchatka

and America, for little is known on that subject." At the cost of his own life and those of many of his seamen, Bering set the Aleutian chain and the coastline of arctic Alaska on the maps of the world, dying of scurvy on his return journey on one of the Russian Komandorski group, now called after this gallant man, a Dane born at Horsens in Jutland, who had taken service under the Czars of Russia. His penetration of these dangerous waters, at the age of sixty, with two small sailing-vessels, the *St. Peter* and *St. Paul*, remains one of the epics of exploration, an astonishing feat of endurance and hardihood. It may be noted that the island of Attu was not discovered till 1742, by Bering's Russian lieutenant, Alexei Chirikov, who had reached Petropavlovsk the previous autumn, but set out again in spring to look for his missing commander.

To-day the strategical position of the Aleutians outweighs their other interests, for they hold the backdoor key to at least four major powers, the United States, Canada, Russia and Japan. China and Manchuria might also be included in this surprising array of neighbours whose houses, fronting on the Seven Seas, have their back-green almost in common on the frozen shores of the Bering. The late American General William Mitchell is credited with the remark that "He who holds Alaska holds the world." The Japanese, to whom the islands are probably as well or better known than to the Americans by the frequent infiltration of poaching craft from the near-by Kuriles, are well aware of the strategic importance of the area, as was shown when early in June they landed troops on the islands of Attu and Kiska, undefended save by "General Fog" (who is, however, a determining factor in the Aleutians). Kiska, which has by far the best harbour in the chain west of Dutch Harbour, is within bombing distance of the secret Japanese base on Paramushiro, the most northerly of the Kuriles, which is less than a thousand miles distant. Kiska would also be an excellent foothold for an attack on Siberia, but its significance to America is that an air-base here could command the three important new bases of the Alaskan defence system, Dutch Harbour, Kodiak 630 miles to the east of the latter, and Sitka, about the same distance south of Kodiak; it would also be within reach of Fairbanks, the inland termination of Alaska's new supply route, the great highway at present being rushed through from Edmonton in Canada. This road has been hailed as the "Burma Road" of the far north, and may form a vital lifeline of supply for Russia and even China.

It is perhaps not very generally realised that Dutch Harbour, which a few years ago consisted merely of a small wharf, a few oil-tanks and a naval radio station, lies over 500 miles nearer to Tokio than Pearl Harbour, and is in the middle of the shortest route between America and Japan. Since 1940 the little island of Amuknak on which it stands in Unalaska bay, under a two-thousand-foot mountain which the coast-guard sailors call Ballyhoo, has been taken over by the military authorities, and many thousands of dollars have been spent upon converting the area into one of the most important naval and air bases in Alaska.

Though a notice in the straggling village street at Unalaska proclaims quite truly that the village lies in the same latitude as Glasgow in Scotland, the Alaskan handbook is perhaps a little unkind to Caledonia in stating that "the climate of the Aleutians is not unlike that of Scotland," for Dutch Harbour is credited with 250 wet days in the year and all save eleven of the rest are said to be foggy. Undamped however by

this assertion (perhaps because I had been born north of the Tweed) I set out in May 1936 on a botanical expedition to this interesting chain, on which the British Museum had welcomed my offer to collect plants for their herbarium. Reaching Unalaska in July by way of Seward and Kodiak island, I made my headquarters at an empty orphanage in Unalaska village. This orphanage, the Jessie Lee Home, kept up by the Women's Home Mission of the United States, in which about 100 native children receive a good education, had just been removed to the more cheerful climate of the Alaskan mainland at Seward. In 1936 Unalaska contained the largest native community in the Aleutians, which are now mostly uninhabited, some 250 of the fast diminishing race of Aleuts, a people somewhat akin to the Eskimos, but to no other members of the human family. When the Russians first discovered the islands this people is estimated to have numbered from forty to fifty thousand, but have now sunk to a disease-ridden remnant of less than one thousand. The Russian traders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exploited the people and the islands for the sake of the valuable furs of seal and particularly sea-otter (much admired by the Empress Catherine and the ladies of her court). The atrocities perpetrated by these traders upon the unhappy natives eventually led to the Siberian Government suspending free traffic in America and resorting to the formation of privileged companies deriving their authority from the Czar, but the whole period of Russian government from 1770 till the islands, with the rest of Alaska, were bought in 1867 by the United States, is stained with bloodshed and oppression of both man and beast. Nor, for many years, did the islanders fare much better at the hands of their new purchasers, for at first they were almost completely neglected. It is only since the beginning of the present century that the United States has awakened to her responsibility towards her remotest citizens, who are now "wards of the Government," and receive free education and medical attention. The Russian missionaries who followed the traders, however, brought Christianity to the Aleuts, and founded upon these remote storm-swept isles the Greek Catholic Church with its triple cross, its turnip-shaped belfries, and its ornate ikonostasis. On the four remaining inhabited islands of Unalaska, Umnak, Atka and Attu, such sanctuaries are still to be found, and even on uninhabited Amchitka, just beyond the Date Line, the small church on the island still remains in good preservation, though it offers shelter now to none save the fox or perhaps a Japanese poacher.

Though I had set my heart upon travelling as far west as the island of Attu, in order to obtain for the British Museum some of the Asiatic species which were not to be found elsewhere, I had at the outset of my journey to Unalaska small idea of the difficulty of getting there. On reaching Dutch Harbour I discovered that there was no means of doing so unless I could obtain transport with the coastguard cutter *Chelan* on her annual voyage of inspection to Attu in August. Such vessels, however, do not usually carry passengers, especially women, for so long a period, but by an urgent application to Washington I was kindly permitted to become a temporary member of that gallant body of sailors, the United States Coastguard, and to make the ninety-ninth in the crew of ninety-eight when the graceful white cutter sailed out of Dutch Harbour one morning in mid-August. It was not *Chelan's* first expedition westward that year. A week or two previously she had carried the famous American scientist, Dr. Ales Hrdlička, who was excavating the ancient Aleut village sites for the Smithsonian Museum,

to a cave on one of the islands of the Four Mountains, where he had obtained a very interesting collection of Aleut mummies. Like the ancient Egyptians, the Aleuts embalmed their dead, suspending them, lashed in grass matting and skins, in the secret recesses of remote island-caverns. The Aleuts have distinct skeletal and skull differences from other races, and one of the skulls found by Mr. Alan May, one of Dr. Hrdlička's assistants, on this occasion, was the largest normal skull ever discovered on the American continent. At an interesting tea-party a few days before *Chelan* sailed for Attu, I had met Dr. Hrdlička in the little house in which he worked at Dutch Harbour. Unknown to myself, I had on that occasion literally supped on mummies, as the scientist's tea-table consisted of a board laid across two boxes of these literal "skeletons at the feast," for his unusual collection was awaiting shipment packed in sixty-eight herring barrels. Before it became a naval base Dutch Harbour was noted for its herring industry, and Scotsmen were brought there in 1917 to teach the natives how to cure the herring in the Scottish fashion. The barrels containing the mummies were thus all labelled SCOTCH CURED! Rumour had it that they became mixed up in the hold on their way south with the real herring barrels, so that some American consumers had perhaps more bones than usual in their breakfasts that season!

Chelan's western cruise lasted three weeks, calls being made at the islands of Atka, Amchitka, Kiska and Attu. Though some of these calls were brief, ranging from three days on Kiska (a reserved shore closed to aliens and to all vessels save those of the U.S. navy on account of its excellent harbour) to a bare three hours at the dangerous open anchorage of Chichagof on Attu, I was nevertheless able to add some interesting species, including half a dozen of the coveted Asiatic flowers from Attu, to the list of about a thousand plants ultimately sent home to the British Museum. When time pressed, the Captain kindly lent me the assistance of a sailor (once of two sailors) to collect the flowers. No doubt the life of a botanist appeared a very dull sort of existence to a coastguardsman, whose chief duty in 1936 was taking soundings in the uncharted seas round Attu, where by means of the fathometer or echo-sounder *Chelan's* navigators charted an important new reef one night between Attu and the Russian Komandorskis, where shoal-soundings of only forty-seven fathoms suddenly brought us up short after we had been drawing depths of three to four thousand fathoms, for the Aleutian Trough is one of the deepest pits of the sea. Our landing on Attu was a touch and go affair, for at last the unusual good weather which had attended our journey that year had broken. For two days we tossed up and down outside the dangerous rocks unable to anchor. But on the third day—Sunday, August 30th—the seas moderated and I was able to set foot on this remote isle, little thinking that in six short years its name was to make headlines in the world's newspapers.

In her thirty-seven inhabitants the coastguard sailors assured me that I made acquaintance with the happiest and best remnant of the Aleut race. Their young energetic "chief," Mike Hodiakoff, a dark-skinned intelligent native, clad in a discarded coastguard officer's jacket and navy trousers and sea-boots, came down to the shore to welcome us before conducting, in embroidered vestments, the service in the little church, for there was no resident priest on Attu. Nor was there a school-master, for though there was a good school building, there were at that time only eleven children on the island, and the United States education

authorities (so I was told) do not send out a resident teacher till there are twelve scholars. Perhaps the most interesting person on Attu was the Chief's old aunt, Maggie Prokopoff, known to the coastguard sailors as "Rock of Ages" because the years pass but Maggie remains unchanged. It is said that she was once married to a Russian officer of high rank, and she is still the most graceful dancer and the best basket-weaver on the islands.

The natives of Attu have a weakness for tobacco, and being too busy with my botanical duties to visit them till my return from the hills, I had sent a quantity of this to Maggie by the hands of my friend Dr. Bingman of the *Chelan*, who was one of the shore party to make his annual inspection of the health of the island. As I bade good-bye to Maggie in the comfortable little modern house which has replaced the Chief's old-time grass-roofed "barabara," Maggie begged me for cigarettes, and, concluding that she had somehow been left out in the doctor's distribution, I sent ashore several more cartons for Maggie before sailing. As we leant over the *Chelan's* rail watching the blue mountains of Attu fading again into the sundown, I turned to Dr. Bingman and asked him :

"What became of all those cigarettes I gave you for Maggie?"

"Why, I gave them to her of course, didn't you tell me to," he replied.

Crafty old Rock! Despite her seeming guilelessness, she is perhaps well qualified after all to take her place in the queues of the war-time world. Rumour has it that she pines once more after the flesh-pots, the cinema and dance-hall of Unalaska, but history is still silent as to the fate of these poor people when in June 1942 the serpent entered into their Eden and the Japanese occupied Attu.

On our return journey to Dutch Harbour we spent three days in the fine enclosed bay on Kiska Island, where *Chelan* compensated her compasses and her crew performed "Abandon Ship" drill, whilst the "Lady Guest" (as my place-card on the officers' mess-table politely called me) explored the bare volcanic tops of this rather wild and mountainous isle, about twenty-five miles long by six or seven broad. In 1936 it was completely uninhabited save by the fox and the sea-eagle. Little did I dream that it, too, like Attu, was so soon to be notorious, and that down in the quiet waters of the harbour, as I sat watching the *Chelan*—now dwarfed to the size of a midget from the heights to which I had clambered—American submarines were presently to sink two Japanese destroyers and leave another "blazing fiercely." For on Independence Day 1942 American sailors (in their own graphic phrase) "knocked the invaders into the middle of next week," thereby inflicting upon them a shock even greater than that sustained by the unsuspecting missionary who was once their companion on these grey fringes of the Date Line. It was Saturday night, and the cleric had apparently announced too soon that he was preparing his sermon, for when the next morning came he was told that it was Monday!

ISOBEL W. HUTCHISON.

THE NEUTRALITY OF EIRE.

TO the ordinary Englishman the case for Irish participation in the present war seems overwhelming. Even if he accepts the contention of the Irish Nationalists that Eire, as a separate nation,

has a right to exercise her sovereignty and to opt for neutrality, he recalls the fate of a dozen once sovereign neutrals, and it seems obvious to him that Eire, in her own interest, should avoid the mistake which has led Norway, Belgium, Holland and Greece to their present unenviable plight. The broad argument of expediency is reinforced in his mind by humanitarian considerations. Assuming an Allied victory—and on any other assumption Eire is bound to lose the national independence and sovereignty for which the Irish Nationalists have fought so long—the war will be won when the United Nations have enough shipping to win it, and not before. Thus the refusal of the Eire Government to permit the use of the treaty ports, by prolonging the war, may well condemn some hundreds of thousands of people in the belligerent and occupied countries to death, whether in actual battle or by starvation. If he is in need of further arguments with which to persuade himself that Eire, in her own interest, should join the Allies, they are not difficult to come by. Eire, the most Catholic country of Europe, is interested in the survival of Christian civilisation, and that civilisation is endangered by every month for which the war is prolonged.

Inevitably, therefore, the ordinary Englishman is profoundly irritated by the Irish attitude, and, seeing very clearly the reasons which should persuade Eire to intervene, he assumes that her failure to do so is prompted by an inherent perverseness of the Irish leaders, by an inability to free themselves from secular prejudices, and perhaps even by a sneaking sympathy for Germany and for National Socialism. He is outraged by the spectacle of Eire enjoying the protection of British sea-power and yet refusing to make any contribution to its maintenance. He is deeply shocked to read that British and Allied airmen, some of whom were actually engaged in convoying ships to Irish ports, have been interned when their machines were forced to land on Eire territory. The spectacle of the German Legation remaining in Dublin—the numbers of its staff swollen ten or twenty-fold by rumour and the imagination of certain journalists—affronts him deeply. He reads with avidity tales of German machinations in Eire and believes stories, which have little or no foundation in fact, according to which the coastline of Eire is being freely used for purposes of refuelling by large numbers of German U-boats. He is even apt to gloat when he learns that the Irish population, despite its neutrality, is nevertheless suffering many of the privations and inconveniences which are afflicting the belligerents themselves.

I went to Ireland duly fortified by all the arguments in favour of Irish participation, or at least of the handing back of the treaty ports. I was further aware that a very high proportion of Eire's manhood had volunteered for service in the British armed forces, and this strengthened in my mind the impression that an intransigent and embittered Government was flouting the true interests of the country. I have returned, after discussing the position with leading Irishmen of many schools of thought, even more convinced that Eire's true interest lies in participation. But in the process I have become aware of certain facts which deserve to be more widely known in Great Britain than they are at present. Perhaps the most striking of these facts is the conviction, shared by many Irishmen who have themselves volunteered for service in the British armed forces, that, though it is the duty of the individual Irishman to fight for an Allied victory, the Eire Government was nevertheless right in its decision to remain neutral.

Before explaining why this seemingly contradictory opinion is so

widely held, it would perhaps be as well to clear up a point which, to some extent, confuses the main issue. In the opinion of the Eire Government there is no essential difference between the handing over of the ports and actual participation. The return of the bases would be considered by the Irish public as tantamount to actual participation. On this matter the attitude of Eire is analogous to that of the Soviet Union when Russia was approached by the United States with a view to the leasing of Siberian bases for use against Japan. It is argued in Dublin that there can be no half-way house between the present position and actual intervention against the Axis. Thus it is perhaps best to face the straight issue of intervention or neutrality rather than hope for a "middle way" which would, in fact, have all the consequences for Eire of actual participation in the war.

How, then, does it come about that there are many Southern Irishmen who, though they are prepared to make the personal sacrifice of volunteering for service in the British army, nevertheless hold that neutrality is the right policy for Eire? The answer is perfectly simple. They believe that Irish intervention in the war would mean civil war in Ireland. They are persuaded that it would play into the hands of the extreme anti-British minority, and they are convinced that, if the De Valera Government decided for war, or for a course of action which would be construed as tantamount to entry into the war, that Government would inevitably be overthrown by a parliamentary landslide or faced by actual civil war. They point out that Eire is able, at the present time, to make a most important, if unspectacular, contribution to the Allied war effort. Recruitment of volunteers from Eire has provided a number of effectives sufficient for several divisions and a substantial number of air squadrons; tens of thousands of workmen have been drawn from Southern Ireland to relieve the acute labour shortage in Great Britain—in fact, Eire herself is faced by an acute lack of workers for the turf bogs, upon which the country very largely depends for fuel in the absence of adequate coal deliveries from Great Britain. And, in addition, Eire is sending exports to Great Britain substantially in excess of the goods which she receives in return, accepting payment in sterling which, for the duration of the war, it is impossible to spend. Thus Eire is providing Great Britain, in considerable measure, with just those forms of assistance which Germany requires of her European allies and of the occupied territories.

Thus it is argued by many—though not by any means all—of those who desire Eire to make her maximum contribution to the war effort of the United Nations that these forms of help are of more value to Great Britain than actual participation. For any attempt to bring Eire into the war against the wishes of the population would play into the hands of the I.R.A., which, though at present a discredited minority, would derive considerable support from the accusation that Eire's true interests were being subordinated to those of "her former oppressor."

This line of argument may be right or wrong, but it deserves to be seriously considered, for it comes from people in Ireland who are heart and soul with the United Nations, and many of whom are actually fighting in the Imperial armies. That the overwhelming mass of the Irish people is in favour of neutrality at the present time seems beyond doubt. The neutrality policy of the Fianna Fail (De Valera) party is supported by the Fine Gael (Cosgrave) opposition, and both Senator McDermott and Deputy Dillon, who came out in support of Irish participation, were promptly ejected from the Fine Gael party.

Although, in the country districts, everyone seemed to hope for, and believe in, an Allied victory, no regrets were expressed at Eire's failure to take part in the war. After dwelling on the shortages and speaking of the danger of actual starvation—for the memory of the great famine is far from dead—people would end up by saying: "but at least we are at peace." In Dublin there were people who felt that the privations which Eire has to bear at present, and in particular the very acute fuel shortage, would be more easily supportable if the people felt that they were the necessary condition of victory. But this opinion is held only by a minority.

Many factors contribute to this general opposition to Irish participation in the war. There is the feeling that a small people, whilst it can make little contribution to the military strength of an association of Great Powers, is all too likely to find that its territory has become a battlefield for the armies of the more powerful combatants; there is the fear of bombing; there is the legacy of the Anglo-Irish troubles and the general failure to appreciate the issues involved in the war. It is probably true of Ireland to-day, as it was true of Great Britain, that bombing appears more alarming in prospect than it would in actual experience. In present circumstances the Irish have not the feeling, which the British have, that their cities are powerfully defended by A.A. guns and night fighters, and the consciousness of defencelessness enhances the fear of air attack. Most important, however, is the survival of the suspicions bred by the long conflict with Great Britain and the general failure to understand the issues involved in the war. It is probably true that 80 per cent. of the Irish people desire an Allied victory; but it is also true that any move which could be represented as a sacrifice of Irish interests to those of Great Britain would revive suspicions which are to some extent dormant but certainly not extinct.

The position would, of course, be fundamentally different if the mass of the Irish people was aware of the issues at stake and recognised the implications for Ireland, as for every other small nation, of a German victory. The fact that this is not the case explains, more than any other single factor, the present attitude of the Irish public to the war. The operation of the Irish censorship is responsible, in considerable measure, for this state of affairs. It is true, of course, that British newspapers circulate freely in Ireland, and that almost everyone listens to the B.B.C. news in preference to Irish news broadcasts. But the fact that there is no specifically Irish discussion of the issues involved in the war, and that such discussion in the columns of the Irish press is banned, fosters the impression that it is a war of conflicting interests and of conflicting imperialisms.

Certain recent developments appear to have brought home, at least to a section of opinion, the truth about German conduct on the Continent. The report of what happened at Lidice was published in the Irish press, since it came from a German source, and, as such, it seems to have opened the eyes of some people in Dublin. But the Irish leaders can hardly be unaware of the facts, or of the implications for Eire of a German victory, and, by failing to tell the public the truth, they lay themselves open to a charge which has often been proffered against the Chamberlain Government—that of failing to tell the public the truth about Germany until it was too late. Mr. De Valera could say with truth of Germany, as Mr. Chamberlain once said of Czechoslovakia, that it is "a distant country of which we know little." But to say this is to tell only half of the story. It is perfectly true that the Irish people

as a whole have little appreciation of the issues involved in the war ; but it is also true that the reason for this lack of understanding is the failure of the Irish leaders to explain those issues to the public.

It can hardly be supposed that the Irish leaders, with the information from their diplomatic representatives in Berlin and Rome at their disposal, can be unaware of the aims and methods of German policy. But, in conversation with them, one is impressed, and depressed, by a complacent tendency to underrate the Germans' ability to overwhelm the resistance of small peoples. Because "for seven hundred years Ireland resisted the attempts of the British to destroy her national spirit," it is assumed that "a nation cannot die," and that "Ireland would deal as successfully with the Germans as she did with the British." "Even if they killed us, our children would live on." The belief that, "because Ireland survived the Black and Tans," she would be equally successful against the technique of Lidice, supported by the tank and the dive-bomber, is one of the most disquieting aspects of the Nationalist outlook. It is the Irish form of the sin of wishful thinking which has brought Great Britain to her present dangerous position.

If the Irish Nationalists are taxed with their failure to appreciate, or at least to make plain to the public, the issues at stake, they often reply that, but for Partition, Eire would be in the war at Britain's side. This is perhaps true in more senses than one, for the presence of powerful British—and latterly Anglo-American—forces in the Six Counties is certainly one reason for Hitler's decision not to invade Eire from his bases in Brittany, a bare 300 miles distant from Cork. And, if it is true that the survival of Partition is one of the contributory causes of Irish neutrality, it is also true that, other things being equal, the policy of neutrality will inevitably operate against the ending of Partition. For it is hardly to be supposed that the British Government, having been denied facilities for the defence of the approaches to Bristol from bases in Southern Ireland, will willingly forfeit, after the war, control of the bases in Northern Ireland which protect the approaches to Liverpool and Glasgow. The issue of Partition undoubtedly bulks large in the eyes of the politically conscious supporters of Fianna Fail in Eire and among the Catholic minority in the Six Counties ; it is held to explain the continued survival of the I.R.A. as an actual, and still more as a potential, political force. But when Government spokesmen assert, as they frequently do, that "three-quarters of the I.R.A. are to be found in the Six Counties," they admit, by implication, the limited extent to which Partition is felt to be a burning issue in Eire.

If the present policy of neutrality militates against the ending of Partition, it has other consequences which are not less serious from a long term point of view. One of the country's main problems is the fact that, under normal pre-war conditions, life in Eire did not offer sufficient inducements to prevent a steady flow of emigrants to the tune of 30,000 a year. If it is estimated that the feeding, clothing, education and medical services provided for these emigrants during the years when they were making no contribution to the life of the community cost not less than £1,000 a head, their departure represented a dead loss to Eire of £30 million a year. It is argued by some of Eire's leading economists and agricultural experts that this drain upon the country's most adventurous elements—a process of inverted natural selection—could be arrested if agriculture was remodelled after the Danish model, making use of the great natural fertility of the land and

of the immense market which Great Britain offers. But this solution, upon which the future well-being of Eire depends, postulates British goodwill, which will inevitably be forfeited if Eire persists in remaining neutral. It is as well to recognise, however, that this line of argument, however cogent it may be, runs counter to the present dominant trend in favour of a measure of self-sufficiency. Indeed, any solution of Eire's economic and social problems, however much it may be recommended by the immutable facts of geography and economics, will always be suspect if it seems to place Eire in a position of dependence upon British goodwill.

To the ordinary Englishman, Irish neutrality is a source of bitterness because Eire seems content to enjoy the benefits of British sea-power and of a continued association with the British Commonwealth without making the slightest sacrifice in order to ensure that that sea-power, which has given the country immunity from invasion and starvation, is maintained. But even if one accepts the contention that Eire has a perfect right to determine her own attitude to the war, it remains true that the Eire Government is following the tragic and disastrous policy which made possible Hitler's technique of "one by one." To many Irishmen, the fact that Eire could opt for neutrality was the crowning proof of their country's sovereignty and independence. But the maintenance of that sovereignty and that independence depends upon the victory of the United Nations, and the fact of having attained sovereignty does not relieve a nation from the obligation of using it wisely. Until December 7th, 1941, it seemed to many Irishmen that, if their country entered the war, it would be doing so simply in order to maintain the British Empire. To-day, Ireland would be fighting at the side of the United States; to which the Irish leaders so often turned for comfort and assistance during their struggle for independence. And, if it is true that the mass of the Irish people are opposed to entering the war because they are not aware of the issues involved, it is also true that those issues have never been explained to them by their own leaders.

The Irish people has, no doubt, good reason for hoping that British sea power and the presence of Anglo-American forces in the Six Counties will preserve them from attack, and that the victory of the United Nations will lead to the preservation of their national independence. In that event they will no doubt continue to believe that the policy of neutrality was right. But it will be a tragedy if they discover, as so many other neutrals have discovered, that they were living in a fool's paradise, and that the manner in which they have exercised their newly-won sovereignty has been the means of forfeiting the very rights for which they have fought so long.

PETER MATTHEWS.

THE HISTORIC CLUE TO GERMANISM.

MANY attempts have been made to analyse the spirit which appears to possess the German people, or a large proportion of them, to-day and which, following certain writers, we may call "Germanism," to avoid making assumptions at the outset. But there has not appeared any explanation of its origin which is completely convincing. Much has been written about the character and

history of Prussianism and the way in which it has infected large numbers of non-Prussian Germans. The influence of a succession of leading thinkers, historians and politicians who have presented ideas of the state, the mission of Germany, and necessity of war, leading more or less directly to the present policy and outlook of the Reich, has been fully examined. The emergence and dominance, at critical moments in history, of certain extraordinary individuals, possessed by an insane passion for power and a capacity for bending the wills of people inclined by nature to crave for leaders, has been given due weight. But the more ultimate reasons for these contributory causes have not been disclosed. Why has Prussianism, as some conclude, entered into the soul of the main German population, a people originally—it is pointed out—without affinity for it and heirs of a different civilisation? Why have the Prussians themselves never cast off the early traditions of their order, ruthlessness, and fanatical devotion to a very narrow and illiberal conception of duty? How was it that philosophers such as Fichte and Hegel abandoned the universalism and internationalism of their great predecessors, Leibniz and Kant—Kant himself a Prussian—for an exaltation of the German race or the Prussian State? Above all, why have the German people been captured by these ideas to the point of embracing the policies to which they have led, with results which have shocked the world, or allowing them to be carried out in the name of Germany, and with their own active participation? Is it a question of race? Have we here a race of high intelligence but lower moral endowment than is possessed by the other peoples of European civilisation? The racial doctrine cannot be substantiated. It has been convincingly shown by scientific students of ethnology that there is no pure race in Central Europe and the German peoples are the product of a mixture of various strains.

It will be argued in the present article that the predominant and fundamental cause of the state of mind under consideration lies in German history, and that this is what ought to be expected, since it is history to which the making and unmaking of nations is due. On the other hand peoples lacking a truly common history pervaded by certain special values do not attain to genuine nationhood, though they may be held together in a single state and act together in war. It would be agreed that chief amongst the historical conditions which are necessary to the growth of a nation is a principle of unity in respect to the conception of civilisation consciously or unconsciously held. In this is implied recognition of the values conceived as most important for life, and willingness to endure labours and dangers for their sake. A common experience in regard to certain very general essentials, such as belonging to the same land, sharing a language and literature, is as obvious as favourable if not indispensable conditions for the basic unity. But above all the common experience must include history in all respects in which it affects the lives and minds of the people, a history through which they have not stumbled as it were haphazardly, blind to the meaning of its events, but one in which they can feel themselves to have played an essential part.

The question still arises—what is the real underlying significance which must enter into the historic experience of a collection of people capable of becoming a nation with national values of its own, which the great majority feel to be worth living and dying to perpetuate? It seems that the vital source of their history must lie in a genuine unity in the principles to which they would appeal if asked what it was that

held them together as one people or community. These principles must have a traditional value expressed in their history, such as, for example, the special quality of the British principle of freedom. The longing of the German people for unity throughout their history has been dwelt upon by Bryce and other historians. But has it taken forms, or shown itself in policies, which could give scope for the development of anything that could be called a spiritual unity? Bismarck's methods of forcing unity upon the separate states illustrate the crudity of the principles which have seemed of chief importance to those men and classes who have dominated German history. When we analyse the conditions of its violent and in many respects catastrophic process, there stands out especially a fatal discrepancy between the character of the ruling orders, princes, barons, landowners, and the character needed in their leaders by the people. Amongst the leading men there was again and again displayed a total lack of high conceptions of their duty, an absence of all trace of statesmanship, a complete disregard of the interests of the people, absorption only in their own ambitions and greed for gain in power and wealth, or the suppression of rivals. On the other hand the German people have throughout their history shown themselves to be such as to need great leaders. This is the outstanding source of its tragic character. We have a people in peculiar need of the best leadership, over against a succession of would-be leaders of the wrong or even the worst type. It must not be forgotten that in speaking of the Germans of history we are speaking of a somewhat multifarious group of societies. But the characteristic signalised above seems to hold good of all, to a less or greater extent. Professor E. H. Carr's survey of German history* does not appear to go to the roots of the problem. It may be said to present a kind of dramatic truth, in accordance with a certain method of historians, in which a nation is treated as if responsible for the process of its history, as a historic personality. According to this view the crux of the German problem resided, not in any ineradicable national characteristics, but in the late date at which Germany achieved national unity and the plenitude of her power. But this does not seem to touch the heart of the matter. What are the characteristics of the people developed through history which led them to express their dissatisfaction at their late arrival on the stage of the great nations, in forms so backward in civilisation, and of so savage a kind?

Professor Carr's interpretation seems to point to the ungovernable ambitions of leaders, the Fredericks, Bismarcks, etc. It seems obvious that the characters of these men largely determined history. But the most crucial problem for the future, how and why the German people, peasants or "masses," have accepted the rôle assigned to them by their ruling castes, slaved for them under the worst treatment in many wars in which they had no interest, ruined their own lives and taken part in the barbarities perpetrated upon other peoples in their name, is not grappled with. Admittedly such was the course of history in some degree elsewhere. But in German history there appears to be less relief, less tendency or urge to rise to a higher level, a more monotonous absence of all national value or meaning.

Turning to such treatments of the German problem as that of Dr. Rohan Butler in his weighty survey of those factors in the dominating intellectual outlook from Fichte to Treitschke which have most

* *Conditions of Peace*, ch. ix.

affected political standpoints in recent centuries,* this does not throw much light on the attitude of the majority. It may, of course, be argued that Treitschke gave to the thousands of students who thronged his lecture-rooms what they were longing to hear. Yet, if so, was this not due to the kind of education they had received almost from infancy, the harsh military discipline which allowed only the slightest scope for those spiritual qualities which are potential in the German, not less than in other peoples? Again, Dr. F. W. Foerster's comprehensive study of the growth and influence of the Prussian idea and system,† whilst he fully recognises the existence in history of a Germany of another type with other ideals of life, does not appear to provide a sufficient explanation of the presumed success of "Prussianism" in capturing the German soul. Nor do we find this in Dr. Stirr's‡ interesting view that the Prussian spirit is not characteristic of a particular part of the population, but a state of mind which may occur in any section. Lord Vansittart's position is difficult to discuss, as he does not appear to attempt any explanation of "Germanism," but regards it as something fixed and incurable, the only treatment appropriate to which is a system of perpetual repression. But the grounds for this view cannot be ignored.

It is hardly necessary, and would be too lengthy, to indicate all those events and trends in German history in which the absence of any contribution to a truly national development is most striking, but the fact may be illustrated by reference to a few of the more disastrous failures. As is pointed out by Dr. Edgar Stern-Rubarth§ during the five hundred years after the coronation of Charlemagne—supposed by some historians to have initiated a genuine movement towards unity—oceans of blood were shed in the struggle to secure German supremacy in Italy as against that of the Papacy. The rise of the Hanseatic towns in the fourteenth century might have been expected to encourage liberal movements and a progressive spirit. But peasants and serfs were treated with not less brutality and injustice by the prosperous merchants and craftsmen than by the feudal lords.¶ From the terrible Peasants' wars which resulted we pass to the Wars of Religion, usually degenerating into struggles for the aggrandisement of Princes and Barons. It might have been hoped that the German Reformation would have brought some alleviation through reform and national revival. But as in other instances it seems as if Germany could not produce leaders whose greatness had no fatal flaw. Luther ignored the wrongs of the peasants and sided with the nobles in their cruel repression of the revolt. During the Thirty Years War civilisation is said to have disappeared over wide areas, and Germany from a leading position in Europe to have been reduced almost to barbarism.¶ Some promise of the growth of a national spirit was shown during the Napoleonic wars. But the leadership of Prussia did not bring liberty to the German people. The liberal movements which distinguished the nineteenth century made a considerable impression in Germany. These, however, were stifled when Bismarck rose to power. A true statesman appeared among the Hohenzollerns in the Crown Prince Frederick. But he waited thirty years for the opportunity which only came to him as a dying man. The doom of Germany in the constant occupation of the centre of the stage by the wrong personality was once more exemplified

* *The Roots of National Socialism.* † *Europe and the German Question.* ‡ *The Prussian Spirit.* § *A Short History of the German People.* ¶ *Ibid.* ¶ Cf. especially H. A. L. Fisher, *History of Europe.*

when a figure in some respects the direct opposite of Bismarck arrived there to facilitate as it were the downward slide of her history. Standing between such men as Bismarck and Hitler, Kaiser Wilhelm II's blundering efforts to cut a fine figure on the world stage may seem but a childish performance. But he must rank with them amongst the impersonations of the evil genius of German history.

If there is significance in the idea of a national soul, it seems obvious that it could not have arisen out of such a history as the Germans as a great collection of people have passed through. The conception if valid is born of the whole history of a people whose chief bonds consist in their common participation in that history, accompanied by some sense if often dormant that in past and present they have played a part in it. It is in this that they have experienced certain values which are not identical with the values of personal experience. The analogy with the individual personality cannot be pressed. The spirit of a nation sometimes seems a chameleon-like being of many colours. Perhaps we may speak of a national quality or factor in individual minds in virtue of which they are conscious of the values (not always the highest) which are the outcome of history. There is also a national ethic sprung from historic evolution to which the individual awakens when in the midst of events which affect the whole society. If then there is a general truth in this view of the growth of a national ethic, the history of the Germans cannot be said to fulfil its conditions. Through a great part at least of their history they have not been allowed the enjoyment of their humanity as a historic community, much less the experience of helping to make this history as a nation. This seems to hold not less to-day. The "mass" mentality has been particularly cultivated and stimulated for their own ends by the ruling clique, whilst the people are tricked into the belief that they are fighting for the glory of Germany and their own ultimate advantage. Their history continues to be void of the inspiration of lofty national ideals. According to reliable neutral observers, the highest conception of a national mission which appeals to the majority as the war goes on is that as the super-nation they are justified in seizing any of the good things which other peoples have acquired by their own exertions. Thus the development of the principal idea of Nazi Ideology—the *Herrenvolk*—shows a progressive deterioration remarkable in contrast with the ancient Hebrew conception of the Chosen People, which attained greater purity in the process of their history.

It must be added that forms of oppression which in their systematic and pseudo-scientific elaboration cover all the nooks and crevices of life under the totalitarian system, and are more inescapable and hostile to the freedom of the mind than the cruder barbarisms of the past, have been deliberately applied to stifle growths if such should show themselves from any seeds of a truly national spirit. The chief weapon is the universally pervading operation of fear, poisoning the most intimate relations of private life. By such means is fostered a state of mind which if it could become universal would prelude the death of any civilisation. For it involves a direct attack on the ultimate sources of civilisation, the originating personality and free mind.

It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the supremely urgent practical issue of the possibilities of a regeneration of Germany after the war. But if there is force in the argument that the problem is the outcome of German history, the question obviously arises of the possibility of this history in the future taking a different direction. It

was indicated above that Professor E. H. Carr's historic interpretation of the extraordinary developments of German policy as determined by a deep-seated and exaggerated consciousness of Germany's late achievement of the rank of a Great Power seemed inadequate to the complexity of the problem. His confidence in the development of a changed spirit in Germany, with the growth of hope of a more satisfactory spiritual and social experience in the community of European peoples in the future, seems also to be somewhat too easily arrived at.

In regard to the psychological problem in the widest and deepest sense, that of the pervasion of the character of a whole people by certain ineradicable and immutable tendencies—as in Lord Vansittart's view—the truth appears to be as follows. Human nature is affected by many tendencies and potentialities, some, perhaps the greater number, of which do not come to actualisation in the majority. Under the experience and discipline of civilised society in early years, and the standards upheld in its traditions, many of these potentialities are checked and disappear altogether, or at least cease to manifest themselves. But, as is well known to social students, the human creature requires favourable conditions for the realisation of his capacities. He needs for his distinctive powers a far more elaborate training than the animal whose natural endowments seem to appear for the most part instinctively. If instead of the appropriate training and guidance only lower and debasing influences are brought to bear on him, he may fall in worth even below the higher animals, lose the power to recover his proper status, and above all the mind that apprehends and desires the values of personal and social life. As in the case of the ancient Janissary system, there is danger that this fate will be that of the Nazi youth who have endured the deadliest of all wrongs, the destruction or permanent enfeeblement of their essentially human qualities.

Many authentic accounts we have had of the education of the German youth seem to place beyond all doubt that this incredible thing has happened, and its results have been such as the majority of educationists would have rejected as impossible in the more optimistic view of human nature characterising the late nineteenth century. Professor E. H. Carr, in his important discussion of the German problem to-day, seems to examine it as, so to speak, merely a development or exaggeration of the problem which faced the victors in 1919, and whose outcome can be avoided by wiser counsels. His treatment of the thesis of the inherent wickedness of the German people as "nothing but the product of an emotional reaction familiar in all periods of history which has led men to brand their enemies as moral reprobates" seems as inadequate as the doctrine of inherent wickedness is psychologically crude. Is it possible that there is something inseparable from the genius of the historic mind which breeds a certain fallacy? The fallacy would arise from the irresistible tendency to attach the present whilst still present to the past. All is history and must conform to the order of history. Contingency, unpredictability, novelty are admitted. But certain types of disorder are excluded. History cannot be entirely wild. The seemingly wild events can be brought into line with those that have become tame to the student in the process of his study of the past. The ascription during war of a special wickedness to the enemy has all happened before. It takes on a new form to-day because we see it with new eyes, but the historian knows that it must exhibit the continuity of history. It may be noted that the journalist, the historian of a day, intent only on what is happening *now*, may find something unknown

to history in the minds of the people he is meeting day by day. So Mr. Shirer, in the course of the nine years he spent in Berlin (before Americans had to leave), found in the ordinary German mind a kind of "intellectual drunkenness."*

It must then be questioned whether proposals such as those of Professor Carr for a post-war solution of the German problem show sufficient recognition of those characteristics which make it unique. As suggested above, the most formidable of these is that passions and tendencies have been let loose which belong to a more primitive age than the present, and which modern civilisation had hitherto prevented from flourishing to any serious extent. The difficulty of believing that this could happen was perhaps the last infirmity of the nineteenth century faith in progress. The first necessity from this standpoint would not be to invite Germany back by appropriate reorganisation to her true place amongst European nations, which she had *ex hypothesi* not abandoned too far. It would rather be to adopt methods for restoring the humanity she has as a nation definitely rejected, but as a great multitude of individuals potentially creative of value cannot have irretrievably lost.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY.

THE problem of Germany's position in the post-war world represents beyond doubt the foremost question in all the minds engaged in finding a solution for a lasting peace and the guarantees of world security. In this war, to a far greater extent than in the last, Germany dwarfs her allies and satellites in personifying the evil of aggression and the loathsome power of ruthless force. Italy and her Dictator have sunk to the level of a music-hall "stooge"; Finland is relegated reluctantly to the misguided and shortsighted accomplice's position in a vast criminal conspiracy; Rumania and Bulgaria are representatives of national greed and weakness which must be paid for by a long period of restitution and repentance. But Hungary plays quite a special part in the ring of assassins and peace-breakers which has dragged the world into the chaos and suffering of war twice within half a century. Japan, by her geographical position, is outside the European picture, and the problem of her future fate must be treated separately from that of her associates in crime.

It is no exaggeration to say that to the Slav countries of Central and Eastern Europe Hungary presents the same obstacle and difficulty which Germany offers to the states of Western and Northern Europe. For over a thousand years the Magyars have been a more or less compact and homogeneous irritant surrounded by an almost complete circle of Slavs. By the choice which she made in 1001, when her first holy king was crowned, Hungary severed herself from her Asiatic past; with the blood her people shed for centuries in their wars with Tartar and Turk she sealed abundantly this pact with Christianity and Western civilisation. It was unavoidable that the Magyar race should be transformed into a mixture of Slav and Turk, German and Hungarian. Yet there was some indefinable and irrational magic in the soil and the air of the country within the chain of the Carpathians—a magic which turned Austrian civil servants sent during the years of

* Berlin Diary.

Habsburg oppression to discipline the rebellious Magyars into enthusiastic patriots ; which absorbed many thousands of Slavs, sometimes without a conscious effort at Magyarisation. National and racial frontiers cannot be drawn in a just manner anywhere east of Vienna ; and even President Benes acknowledged this when in a recent speech he said that he would prefer to adopt Hitler's methods of wholesale forced migrations and re-settlements if this was the only way to avoid the inclusion of considerable minorities within the frontiers of a reconstituted Czechoslovakia. The problem of Hungary and her neighbour is only capable of solution if the view we take is an international and not a narrowly national one.

It is perhaps necessary to recapitulate Hungary's record between the two wars. The Treaty of Trianon deprived her of two-thirds of her territory and more than half of her population. It would have been unnatural and inhuman if this treaty—whether just or unjust seems to be futile to argue—had failed to drive her into the camp of the “have-nots.” She was watched with suspicion by the chain of victors around her ; there was much in her behaviour which justified this suspicion, even if a fair part of subsequent charges has remained unproved. It is quite certain that Hungary would have preferred to achieve some rectification of her frontiers, some lasting settlement of her relations with the Little Entente, through the help of Britain and France. The anglomania of Hungarians has been called naïve and very much resembling calf-love ; but it was a deep respect and admiration for a great country whose Magna Charta was duplicated by the Magyar Golden Bull, and whose institutions had served as models for the great movement of reform which Count Stephen Széchenyi initiated in the early nineteenth century. Britain, however, was not interested in Hungary's wooing ; or rather, when in the person of the late Lord Rothermere there appeared an Englishman sympathetic enough, the Magyars showed such embarrassing and ecstatic gratitude, completely misjudging his political power and standing in his own country, that they spoiled whatever chance they had. France, of course, being militarily and financially committed to the South-Eastern *status quo*, and having found good reason for indignation and contempt in the disastrous affair of the half-baked Hungarian “ patriots ” who forged French francs, was adamant in opposing Hungarian claims. No wonder that Italy and later Germany became the lodestar for Hungarian politicians whose main constructive political programme consisted of revisionism.

This, however, is the crux of the matter both in the past and for the future. It would be a grave mistake, I think, to identify Hungarian politicians and the whole Horthy régime with the Magyar people even to a far smaller extent than we identify Hitler's gang with Germany. The reasons for this are quite simple. Germany, a highly industrialised and literate country, is far more conscious politically than Hungary. The German voter, the German student, the German soldier, knew perfectly well what they were doing when they accepted Hitler for their leader and endorsed his policy. The Hungarian peasant who represents the great majority of the population has always been desperately poor. He cannot even afford a newspaper ; I have known some villages where peasants bought matches singly because the few farthings which a box cost were beyond their means ; in the cottages people went to bed during the winter as soon as dusk fell because they had no oil for their lamps. The social system which has been Hungary's curse has also

determined her political duality—the semi-literate masses led by political cliques which seldom represented the real will of the nation. Of the Prime Ministers who ruled Hungary since 1919 few had any understanding for the wider problems of the landless peasantry. Count Stephen Bethlen, who survived ten years of stormy weather, was far more interested in securing compensation for Transylvanian aristocrats who have lost their estates than in a thorough land reform. To-day, by a queer change of political constellations, he is looked upon as being a Liberal and an anti-Nazi. Julius Gömbös was a Fascist “mystic” who chose for the symbol of his party the mythical wonder stag of ancient Hungarian legends and was deeply involved in Mussolini’s Balkan intrigues. Béla Imrédy, who leads to-day one of the numerous Hungarian Nazi parties in spite of being non-Aryan, was head of the National Bank of Hungary and allied to Hungarian big business. László de Bárdossy, who has been the instrument for making Hungary a complete vassal of the Axis, spent most of his career abroad as a diplomat and lost all touch with the burning questions inside the country. Nicholas Kállay, the present Premier, is a colourless yes-man who lacks all qualities of leadership. Count Paul Teleki was an ultra-Conservative who had fully merited an international reputation as a geographer but was fundamentally too much of a gentleman to be a successful politician in Central Europe. He, however, possessed the moral courage to refuse to break his word as a gentleman, and when his cabinet and the Regent left him shamefully in the lurch, he preferred death to the disgrace of treachery. De Bárdossy was less particular, and Hungarians marched against Yugoslavia just as a few months later they marched against Russia, thereby sealing the doom of their country—at least under the present political and social régime.

But what should happen to Hungary? She is there, in the very centre of Eastern Europe, dividing the Northern Slavs from their Southern brothers, acting as a constant irritant and an obstacle to Slav desire for a greater, final unity. Whatever census we accept, there are over 10 million Hungarians. They cannot be exterminated, they cannot be shipped back to Asia; they must be found a place in Europe which is worthy of their high culture, their undoubted spiritual qualities—and yet a place which is in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Britain—like many individual Britishers—has been sometimes accused a little peevishly by the champions of the former Little Entente and certain Slav politicians of having a weak spot for dashing and romantic Hungarian aristocrats, for the fascinating beauty of Budapest, for Hungarian music and food. I agree that these should not be determining factors in deciding Hungary’s future fate; but on the other hand I do not see why they should be used as arguments against the Magyars. There have been certain declarations, mainly by leading Czech politicians, about the complete return to the Trianon frontiers and lasting guarantees of Hungarian disarmament. The problem is gravely complicated by the dispute between Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania; and as Rumania, too, is in the Axis camp for the moment, it seems to be almost impossible to decide this question before the end of the war. But the relationship of Hungary and the other Slav countries could and should be settled before hostilities are over. Only thus can we avoid the return of chaos in Central Europe and a long period of wasteful antagonism which would hinder reconstruction and hold up, perhaps indefinitely, the creation of some sort of federal union in that region.

I quite agree with those who maintain that with the present rulers of Hungary it is impossible for the Slav countries to come to an understanding. Nor is it possible that a Magyar state with the same social structure as before should exist side by side with democratic countries. As soon as the United Nations have broken the German might, the present régime in Hungary is bound to collapse—long before the Allied troops would march deep into the European Continent. Horthy, half-puppet and half-criminal, will be swept away together with the Hungarian quislings. There will be in all probability a more or less bloodless revolution; I do not think that this will take the form of a communistic uprising because the Hungarian peasant, without whose backing no lasting social change can take place, had an unfavourable impression of communism during the Bela Kun experiment in 1919. Whatever the Hungarian Soviet Republic might have become if it had survived, the brief months of its existence antagonised the peasantry and left a bitter memory which Horthy's White Terror did not counterbalance. It is far more likely that this Hungarian revolution will be a liberal-agrarian one with a peasant leader emerging who will be able to form a common platform with the industrial workers and the liberal middle classes. That such a revolution is not a utopian dream, and that all the elements for a successful anti-Nazi stroke are present in Hungary, can be easily proved by a study of Hungarian life in the last few months. Hardly a day passes without a farmer or a workman being sentenced to prison for sabotage, anti-German utterances, or refusal to serve in the vassal army of Hitler's cannon fodder. There are Hungarians fighting in General Michailovitch's guerilla forces; Hungarian soldiers have surrendered in great numbers to Russian troops because they did not want to bear arms against their own interests for their own future enslavement. Though we hear seldom about it, the anti-Nazi forces in Hungary are strong and unsubdued.

The first important step which this new government will have to take will be a sweeping land reform. The enormous estates of the aristocrats, the Esterházys, Festetics, Károlyis, etc., will have to be divided into small—but not too small—plots for the landless peasantry. It is rather unfortunate that the Catholic Church has been a bad offender in this respect; the vast Church lands will also have to be expropriated and carved up to some extent. It is only fit and proper that Hungary's tragic army of itinerant landworkers should be given the first chance of a few acres and the means to till them.

With a Hungary which has introduced such a land reform and whose government is liberal and agrarian, the Slav countries must and can find a basis for co-operation. Here, of course, we come up against the thorny problem of the Trianon Treaty once more. I think that a compromise can be found between the unyielding viewpoint of President Benes, who demands the return of all territories recovered by Hungary since 1938, and the fantastic chauvinism of Hungarian revisionists who covered their own dishonesty and inefficiency by blaming the country's difficulties solely on the loss of these territories in 1919. The Slav countries and their spokesmen have often used the argument that every square inch of recovered soil must be returned because Hungary regained it through German help and by methods which, if not always aggressive, were certainly coercive. But the ethnographic and geographic facts are uninfluenced by these circumstances; and I do not think that any, however extreme, Slav politician could declare that the Treaty of Trianon was just in every particular. The compromise

which I propose would certainly be to the disadvantage of Hungary ; she would have to return most though not all of the territory she has been given back after Munich. But if a federation with a liberal-agrarian Hungary is accepted by the Slav countries, frontiers and national barriers should vanish in South-Eastern Europe, and it will matter little under which flag a man lives if he has been made the free citizen of half a dozen countries and given the chance of making a decent living. Lest this again sound too utopian, I may refer to Kossuth's hundred year old plan of a Danubian Confederation which has found many disciples and elaborators and which would surely be the only satisfactory solution of Slav-Magyar and Slav-German co-existence.

A few words about the Free Hungarian movements which should play an important part in preparing an understanding with the other South-East European countries. The Hungarians are somewhat handicapped by the fact that the leaders of these free movements have either left Hungary a long time ago or had had no previous political standing inside the country. The only exception is Mr. Tibor Eckhardt, though he is hardly suitable to represent a free Hungary in discussions with the Slav leaders. I do not feel myself to be a competent judge whether he left Hungary because he sincerely loathed the Nazis and wanted to work against them, or, as his opponents maintain, because he wanted to act as Admiral Horthy's spokesman. Neither of these views can be proved, but unfortunately his past is one which he cannot live down. In addition to his anti-Semitic activities—he was at one time the leader of the "Awakening Hungarians," the spiritual ancestors of Hungarian Nazis—he is ruled out by his work for Hungary at Geneva during the bad and distasteful discussions which followed King Alexander's assassination at Marseilles. Italy, the real culprit, got away scot-free and Hungary got away with a mild reproof ; but I do not think that the Slavs will ever forget his rôle in the business which only history can judge at a safe distance of years.

Count Michael Károlyi and M. Anthony de Zsilinszky are both leaders of free Hungarian movements in this country. Count Károlyi, former liberal Prime Minister of Hungary, has a large following in the United States among the million Magyars over there ; M. de Zsilinszky has resigned an important diplomatic post to stay in Britain and rally his countrymen for the fight on Britain's side. The two movements have no fundamental differences and there are signs that they are drawing together. If it takes place, they will certainly represent a body with which Hungary's neighbours can have profitable conversations as to their future relations.

To sum up, the problem of Hungary presents the following facets and directives for solution :

1. The Hungarian people are far less responsible for the abominable acts of their present government than the Germans ; they have proved by their very active resistance that they cannot be identified wholesale with their quisling rulers.
2. Hungary's main internal problem is that of agrarian reform ; with a liberal-agrarian Hungary the Slav countries could and should find an understanding.
3. The problem of Trianon should be solved, not by a complete reversion to pre-1938 frontiers, but by a compromise which would be greatly facilitated by the adoption of some federal union in the Danubian region.

4. The future leaders of Hungary will be supplied by those anti-Nazi groups which are at the present working inside Hungary ; but the free Hungarian movements in Britain and the U.S.A. offer valuable contacts to the exiled Slav governments for preliminary discussions. Hungarians, like Slavs, must prove themselves good patriots by being and acting as good Europeans. Only thus can we solve the problem of Hungary and the manifold problems of South-Eastern Europe after the war has been won by the Allies.

PAUL TABORI.

WILL THE FAMILY DISAPPEAR ?

IT certainly looks like it if we may judge by a prolonged correspondence in *The Times* on the Falling Birth Rate, initiated by Sir Leonard Hill in the early part of this year (1942). Statistics given by him and other writers dealing with this subject seem to indicate quite unmistakably that though for some years the actual total population will not decline, owing to increased longevity, the birth rate shows an alarming decrease, from 28·2 in 1901-5 to 15 in the years 1931-5. Some statisticians who have studied this subject with the greatest care estimate that within a century our population of 40 million will dwindle to 4,500,000.

It may, of course, be said we cannot concern ourselves with what will happen in a hundred years, but that is surely a shortsighted view, for every year the decline is going on, and in this question of the birth rate there can be no hurried reform—the matter must be dealt with now if anything is to be done to stay decline and to prevent racial extinction. Every year sees the decrease of young life and the increase of the old.

The White Paper issued this year (1942) and giving truly startling figures supplied by the Registrar-General, on this question of the age of the population at stated periods, amply supports the view taken here, while the Registrar-General's statistical review of England and Wales in 1938 (not to be published at present owing to paper shortage, but a resumé of which has appeared in the Press, May 1942) shows the astonishing decrease in the fertility of women since 1911.

Thus it seems clear that we are becoming a nation of old people, with a constantly decreasing number of the young, a parlous situation for a great nation and one that will be infinitely worse at the end of this war, when so many young men, potential fathers, will have given their lives in the service of their country and a whole generation will have been lost. What a burden the young will have to bear in caring for the old in the way of pensions, insurances, etc., and how these healthier older men will cling to their offices, keeping the young from promotion, etc.

To prevent this decline in our youthful population it has been shown by Sir Leonard Hill and other investigators of this problem, fraught with such serious and even dangerous national implications, that at least four children should be born to each family. It is not only in the higher social and professional classes that this decline is noted, but also among the middle-class, the artisans and the agricultural labourers, indeed in every rank of society.

Among the more thoughtful of the working classes it has long been realised through actual experience that, owing to the present economic system, the cause of poverty is the large family. " The greatest single

cause of poverty in this country is young children," stated Sir W. Beveridge in 1940. It is not, therefore, surprising that the more intelligent workers, rightly struggling to reach for themselves and their children a higher level of physical health, greater opportunities for mental culture and more leisure in which to develop their talents and tastes, refuse to bring into the world children to whom they can promise so little.

But though these factors may account to a large extent for the decline of the birth rate among the working class, they do not supply any adequate reasons for the childless or one- or two-children family of those far better off in material goods. Why do the professional man with a good income and the business man with a large house, a country cottage and a car, who send their children to expensive boarding schools, take the family abroad for holidays and stay at big hotels (all pre-war luxuries, of course; things may be quite different after the war), restrict their families?

Primarily I believe it is the woman in these days, except perhaps among the poorest and least educated, who very largely settles the size of the family, and it is right that this should be so. Too long in the past was the wife forced—mainly by convention—to bear those families of 7, 8, 9 and even more children, so characteristic of Victorian days, Queen Victoria herself, with her large family, being the model mother. Though few decent Englishmen ever held the hateful German ideal of the "Kinder, Kirche, Küche" view of a woman's duties, still woman was largely regarded until the present century as mainly of value as the housewife and mother of many.

It is a sign of woman's progress towards independence that she more or less chooses when she will have children, and how many she will have. But the swing of the pendulum would seem to have gone too far, and from the nineteenth century mother who loved a big brood of children, who found a very large part of her happiness in her home and her children, who used her intelligence to bring up her children as wisely as she could and who made the home the centre of happiness to husband and children alike, and a place to which the latter returned again and again, cherishing the picture of their home to the end of their days, we have gone to the other extreme. We have the mother who, if she has only one or two children, often finds them too difficult to deal with, or not sufficiently satisfying to give her a full and happy life, while to the children home is no longer the centre of interest and activity.

If the mother belongs to the professional class she will often later return to her paid career, or take up public work, and hand over the little ones to well-trained nursery nurses and nursery schools, preparatory schools, and when old enough to boarding schools. If, however, she is of the industrial class and has worked in a factory up to the time of her marriage she will, in many instances, send the babies to a nursery until at five years of age the Council School claims them, she herself going out to daily work, struggling, often heroically, to keep home together and bring up the children decently. Why, then, should she wish to have more than a couple of children?

In the light of these facts (which seem to apply to a large number of women) certain questions arise. Does the modern woman love her children in the way mothers of earlier generations did, and does motherhood to-day carry with it that willingness to devote much time and personal attention to the home and the children and even to make

sacrifices for the children so willingly accepted by the average mother of the nineteenth century? And—a very important question this—do children afford her pleasure and joy and the sense of fulfilment of her rôle as woman?

It would almost seem as if the educated women of to-day liked to study children impersonally and scientifically. The modern interest in psychology has seized hold of the educated younger women and has too often made them afraid to deal with their own children and has given them an undue respect for training, even if it is only for a short period. The natural link between mother and child, the experience which motherhood should and often does produce, seem to count for so little in the bringing up of children to-day. The pursuit of a career, the paid work outside the home, are in so many instances much more attractive than the often tiresome details of a young child's daily life.

If this is a natural development in the evolution of woman it would seem difficult to alter it. But the education of girls during this century may have had something to do with this attitude of women towards children. In her struggle to gain the vote and to show she was the equal of man on the intellectual plane, an essential factor in the progress of woman, she had to put on one side, at any rate temporarily, some of her finest feminine qualities. The education that was given her followed largely and naturally at first the lines of that given to her brother, the aim of which was a paid career.

Yet probably the best service a woman can render the State is to train up good citizens, and it is indeed a strange omission in the curriculum of our girls' schools that practically nothing has been done to put before young girls the ideal of noble motherhood. Education can do almost everything, as we know from the Germans and the Japanese who have been educated to kill and to be brutes, and have learnt their lesson only too thoroughly. Do we not now urgently need a different type of education for our girls, and who in the New Order after the war will be brave enough to formulate it?

But education alone will not produce more babies! As long as our standard of living is so high, as long as the domestic problem is such a vital factor in family life, as long as insecurity in employment exists among the working classes and is prevalent among the professional classes to a greater extent than becomes vocal, as long as our economic system too often makes a high material standard the measure of a man's success, so long will men and women restrict their families to one or two children so that each may enjoy all the advantages which spell victory in the modern battle of life.

Among the working classes it is indeed understandable that parents who have faced poverty, unemployment and misery, and whose parents before them endured the same hardships, are going to prevent their children, if possible, from suffering these cruel handicaps to the good and happy life, and as things are now this means a limitation to two children at most. Yet, as we know, if the population in this country is not to decline, and that rapidly, four children at least must be born to each set of parents.

Apart from the importance of children to the State, has not the family an inestimable value to the individual and to each member of the family? Why have we made so little in recent years of the joys of family life in which are bound up for most of us all that we know of truest happiness and deepest emotion? Take away the family from national life, and what is left? What has the average man and woman

to love and work for, but the family ; and what can be put in its place ? Men perhaps are naturally more ambitious and more of the wandering type than women, and can find interests in public life in a way few women can. A woman seems to need children to fulfil herself, and whether she be married or not she suffers if any kind of artificial restriction is placed upon the bearing of children. Healthy married men and women find in their children a constant source of happiness ; anxiety, too, very often, but it is the natural anxiety of being human, not that starved, neurotic misery that comes from non-fulfilment of natural laws.

The family may not be ideal, it is often by no means that ; it is constantly too self-centred, too narrow in its outlook on life, not caring enough for other people's families, not sufficiently "community-minded," but it seems to be the best type of life we have so far evolved. Man does not do well in isolation, not as a rule in institutional life ; he needs someone to love, to work for, to be closely companionable with, and these things are most often found in family life.

A family need not in the least prevent a mother from contributing some share to public matters. While the children are young, during childhood and adolescence, the Mrs. Jellyby type of female is a menace. But there is no reason why she should not take an interest in, and do something for, those outside the family and keep herself thoroughly conversant with affairs of the day, thereby making herself a more intelligent companion to her husband and children, and a better mother in every way. And at 40 or thereabouts, when the children no longer have the same personal claim upon her, she will have time to devote to her duties as a citizen. Wise, politically-minded women of mature views are badly needed in Parliament, on Borough Councils and on Education Committees, and the like.

If, then, the family is of the utmost value to the nation and to the continuance of our race, and at least four in each family is needed for that purpose, it remains to be discussed whether anything concrete and practical can be done to stop this decline of population, which is not a question of a remote future but of here and now. Some suggested remedies could be adopted with little delay, others are of longer growth and can only now be initiated, leaving time to bring them to fruition.

Let us learn from our ally Russia, where of recent years the population has gone up by leaps and bounds. Why ? The answer seems clear—everything possible is done for the pregnant mother before, during confinement, and after the birth of her child. Crèches, nursery schools, schools of all kinds with excellent meals in all of them, and where the workers' children remain till the mother returns from work, give the Russian mother that freedom from anxiety and from that terrible overwork which often make the life of a married industrial worker with young children in this country a veritable nightmare.

After the war the well-being of the children should be one of the very first items in the programme of reconstruction. The lives of the children during these war years have been sadly broken up, and family life has been greatly weakened (it could not be otherwise), by the absence of the father, the employment of the mother, and the separation through evacuation of parents and children, brothers and sisters. A mighty purposeful effort will have to be made to mend these families.

A reform that might be introduced at once is that of Family Allowances, advocated so untiringly by Miss Eleanor Rathbone and until now

merely a matter for academic discussion. But since the Trades Union Congress has withdrawn all opposition to them—Labour always feared reduction of wages—the Labour Party Conference 1942, by a very large majority, voted for them, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer issued a White Paper on the subject this year (1942), Family Allowances may now be said to come within the sphere of practical politics, although no definite policy has been laid down by the Government. The White Paper merely gives figures showing cost of grant of 5s. weekly to every child up to 15 years of age on a non-contributory and contributory basis.

Helpful as Family Allowances would be to the working classes they would, however, have to be on a higher scale than the 5s. weekly named in the White Paper, as that amount would do practically nothing to encourage the professional classes to have their four children. Only public opinion and education will help here, and both to be effective take time. Would it not be worth while for some of our public-spirited women—there are so many of them nowadays who are good mothers as well as excellent citizens and speakers—to conduct a great campaign for Better Motherhood, Bigger Families? Such a campaign would have the support of the best doctors, scientists and teachers, patriotic men and women of affairs, and of a great many of those average human beings who make up the bulk of our population.

Probably after the war economic necessity will oblige us all to lead much simpler lives. Smaller incomes will mean that children of the upper classes can no longer be sent to expensive boarding schools, cars will not be regarded as essential to happiness, paid pleasures will have to be fewer for all classes. Such changes may help to re-create the home and strengthen the family life. Children will not cost so much and hence it may be possible to have the four which the nation needs.

Another point to consider. The experience of the Land Army during this war has shown that girls of all classes like and can do land work which envisages a simpler mode of life, a smaller income. When country lads and lasses receive a secondary education with an agricultural bias, without having to go to a town to get it, many of the pupils, now lured by the attractions of town life, may like to remain in the country, and many a girl may be willing to rear a family of three or four in the country in a condition of comfort and security which the recent increase in agricultural wages seems to promise. England, as recent events have shown, needs a large agricultural population, and though you can no more make a man stay in the country than you can make a woman bear children, yet State policy and public opinion can be such that it will help in both cases to make what is good for the State pleasant and possible for the individual.

The future of our race may not be as precarious as is here depicted. Some change may occur in our economic and social system that will greatly encourage the larger family. The present dangerously low birth rate may be checked. We cannot foresee the future. But this may be safely said. It is largely in the hands of the women that the betterment of the situation lies. If they desire more children they will work for such improvements in conditions as will make the possession of several children the normal lot of men and women, the family a source of joy and pride, and the home the happiest place afforded to mortals in this imperfect world.

In the New Order woman has her greatest rôle to play, that of the preserver of our island race which, if it disappears—and the disappearance

of the family is the disappearance of our race—will be a loss to the progress of civilisation which the modern world after the war can ill afford. Moreover, why make tremendous efforts and sacrifice to win a victory for our people who within a comparatively few years will consist of old men and women, leaving a mere handful of young folk to dwell in “England’s green and pleasant land”?

FLORENCE B. LOW.

THE MIRACULOUS IN RELIGION.

THE problem of miracles is one which the twentieth century, along with other problems no less mighty, has been content to shelve. It would, in fact, be no exaggeration to say that the bulk of modern Biblical criticism ignores it. We know that the healing miracles of Jesus, for instance, are now generally accepted—though they are no longer regarded as miracles; and we affirm (by no means accurately) that they are performed every day in the consulting-room of the Harley Street psycho-physician. Other reported miracles—the Walking on the Water, the Feeding of the Five Thousand, and the Changing of the Water into Wine—we are inclined to discard as the typical products of an uncritical and unscientific age—which may or may not possess symbolic value but which can certainly no longer be regarded as fact.

This attitude, however, simply will not do; and I think it probable that before long the general revolt against liberal modernism which is already attacking both the ancient universities will burst up over this question. For it cannot be doubted, on a reading of the New Testament, that the evangelists regarded the miracles of Jesus as evidence of His Divine Mission; and that Jesus Himself, while refusing to work miracles for the purpose of creating faith, undoubtedly made use of them as evidence of His Messiahship. The experiment of reconstructing the Gospels without the miracles has never been attempted—probably because they would be unrecognisable in that form. We would be left with a teacher as great, perhaps greater than Socrates, Buddha or Confucius; but one who gave no evidence that they would have been unable to give of a unique relationship to God.

It is, moreover, quite inconceivable that, if the miracles of Jesus had not been well attested they would not have been disposed of by the enemies of Christianity; but no such attempt seems to have been made. There was every reason for doing so once Christianity began turning the world upside down, and we do not have to wait for the Acts of the Apostles even to learn how searching endeavours were made to disprove their success; but all apparently in vain. Even Celsus, when confuting Origen in the third century, was obliged to tap another source. He accepted the miracles of Jesus as historical; but he endeavoured to explain them in terms of Black Magic—the secret art of which he believed was acquired by our Lord during His early life in Egypt. The credulity of that early world is, in fact, far too readily assumed; and there is not wanting evidence, both Christian and pagan, of those who would have given much to disprove the miracles of Christ and the Apostles. This fact has never been fairly faced by modern New Testament critics.

There is, however, another reason why the problem of miracles is not a popular one at the present time—a better and a sounder one. For one good result which has come of the cynicism and disillusionment of the

last twenty years is a humbler, if at times a rather shame-faced, attitude towards those many problems which nineteenth-century optimism thought science could solve. It is quite impossible to doubt any longer that the earth is round, or even that it moves round the sun, and it is extremely unlikely that the scientific theory of Man's evolution from lower species will ever be called in question again ; but the rude shocks which progress has received, the hard blows that have been dealt at civilisation and the doom to which material inventiveness has brought us have shattered our certainties. We are beginning to jump at the sight of shadows and ask ourselves whether, after all, we have not got some of our basic conceptions wrong ; and this is the reason why I am bold enough to suggest that we shall be prepared to revise some of our most deeply rooted notions about the fixed laws of science and mathematics—particularly when the earth seems to be breaking around them. Are we so sure, after all, that we really have defined the limits of which Nature and its crowning achievement Man are capable ?

The moral objection to miracles is, I suppose, the quite legitimate assumption (when St. Thomas Aquinas takes as axiomatic) that God cannot contradict His own laws. If, then, He organised the laws of Nature, no miracle is possible which violates those laws ; but, of course, we have no right to assert what actually *does* violate those laws until we are quite certain what those laws are. It will, however, be necessary, for the purposes of this argument, to assume that no miracle *contra naturam* ever has or ever could occur ; but this is not to assert that miracles *supra naturam* are impossible. An event may be regarded as *supra naturam*, I suggest, when it nowhere contradicts our experience of reality although we are utterly unable to account for it—to trace its cause or follow up the sequence that culminates in the event. I would maintain that the emergence of mind in the evolutionary panorama (a staggering phenomenon that is conveniently by-passed by too many materialists) is what I should regard as a miracle *supra naturam*, and from this it is naturally deduced that every human birth is a miracle. The same might be said in regard to the appearance of life. Any act of creation may be regarded as *supra naturam* in so far as it cannot be accounted for on any natural grounds ; but it is not, of course, in any sense to be regarded as *contra naturam*. It is governed by laws of its own that are perfectly in harmony with Nature, and to a certain extent dependent upon Nature ; but which are apparently not subservient to Nature.

Some of the New Testament miracles would seem at first sight to go into the category of the *contra naturam* ; and this, I think, constitutes the real difficulty in regard to them. It would seem that God not merely *suspended* the laws of Nature but actually contradicted them ; and I, for one, would be unable to believe in such miracles ; but a closer scrutiny of them has convinced me that, while they do violence to certain assumptions that we have made about the nature of things, those assumptions are by no means conclusive.

The miracle of Cana is an apparent contradiction of the laws of Nature. We are apt to say, in condemnation of it as a fact, that water is water and wine is wine—that, in fact, each has properties and constituents of its own that would make a change of one into the other completely impossible ; but I would suggest that the constituents of water, though in one respect determined, are in another most mysterious : (a) nobody knows how it appeared upon this earth at all on the evolutionary hypothesis, (b) it is impossible to say why or even *how*

the union of oxygen and hydrogen produces that entirely new entity—water, and (c) from the earliest times water has been regarded by mankind as possessing healing as well as cleansing powers—as something more than merely physical ; and this belief is not without the kind of concrete evidence for its truth that the true scientist is willing to accept in other spheres.

There is, moreover, a very real sense in which water is being changed into wine all the while. The sap which is in the vine—the very mind and soul of the grape—is the water that it drags from the soil which gives it birth. This is a perfectly natural birth in which earth and air have played their part. The water has gone up into heaven and returned to the earth where it is generated into sap ; and when the grape has been plucked, and the juice extracted, the process neither adds nor subtracts anything. Earth, air, fire and water have done the task—the natural sun and the natural soil ; and the wine which it becomes in its maturity is the same as the water that was conceived in the vine.

For it is not, I think, unreasonable to suppose that if God can suspend His own laws He can also accelerate them—that, in fact, one who had reached and understood the springs which lie at the roots of Nature, might have achieved the one or the other in the working of God's purpose. Man has his blunt and clumsy methods of changing water into wine—by a process of cultivation, distillation and fermentation ; but Christ, Who knew of other laws more close to the heart of Nature, may have achieved the whole process in a twinkling—a process, be it remembered, that in the last resort does violence to no natural law.

The Feeding of the Five Thousand is another miracle of the New Testament that would seem to violate the laws of possibility, and we are apt to discard it airily for this reason—quite regardless of the fact that it made a profound impression upon those who witnessed it ; and I dare to suggest that here again we have miscalculated—miscalculated here in an almost literal sense. For this miracle, unlike any others recorded in the New Testament, violates a law of mathematics rather than a law of Nature ; and I am bold enough to suggest that it is our mathematics, and not the miracle, that is at fault.

Now we all know that, in mathematics, multiplication is a form of addition. If I say that $7 \times 7 = 49$, I do not mean that the original 7 reproduces itself seven times. I mean that if we add 7 sevens together the total result is 49. Mathematics, therefore, knows nothing of multiplication as distinct from addition ; and in this she differs from Nature. For Nature *can* multiply, and does so every day. We have but to mate two kinds of any species in order to perform Nature's multiplication miracle ; and I call it "multiplication" and "miracle" because it is both. It is actual multiplication and not a more convenient name for addition ; and it is "miracle" because we know nothing about the cause and effect—or perhaps I should say about that moment between cause and effect which results in conception—the moment when the multiplication trick is accomplished.

Let us, then, apply this to the multiplication of the loaves and fishes. We must assume that Jesus, even if we are not prepared to believe that He was the Incarnate Son of God, had at least got hold of what I have called the springs at the roots of Nature. This is not a very daring assumption to make in view of the profound and altogether tremendous impression that He made upon His witnesses—some of whom were certainly not fools. He takes a few small loaves and fishes ; and, in order that the hungry and exhausted crowds should not go home from

hearing Him fainting by the way, He multiplies these loaves and fishes until all should have enough and over for their immediate needs. I suggest that what Jesus did was to put into operation certain natural laws that are at work in the universe every day and all day ; but that, instead of pulling the strings so to speak in a physical manner, which might well have been impossible, He had at His command those spiritual forces that have evaded the microscope of the scientist just because they are spiritual and not physical.

We know, for instance, that the laws which control the multiplicity of the species must be, in the last resort, physical—at least in result ; but something occurs at the moment of conception for which no antecedent can account and no consequence explain—although, of course, that consequence is nothing more or less than a reproduction of the species. This is multiplication in the real sense of the word. It does not add something of the same kind to what already exists, but reproduces the existent species. The human family, to take this operation at its highest, is not a series of individuals added to the family from outside, but a multiplication of the parents from inside ; and the same law goes right down through Nature like a wedge whose thin edge sticks in the earth and whose fat edge populates the universe.

Now it is, of course, an axiom of mathematics that nothing less than two can multiply. The multiplication of 1×1 merely results in 1, and the multiplication of any number by a fraction only reduces it ; and, what is true of mathematical multiplication in theory, is true of actual multiplication in practice. It is part of Nature's law that two are necessary for the multiplication of the species. There is no birth without conception, and no conception that does not require two partners for the enterprise. There are, of course, elementary forms of life in which two partners are not needed to perpetuate the species ; but here the operation is not one of reproduction, but a splitting up of the original life into a number of small existences. It is divisional rather than multiplicatory ; and, while it possesses an interest of its own, does not throw any light upon the particular miracle under discussion.

I would suggest, then, that the theory of multiplication—conceived as such by the mind but capable of expression only as an amplified form of addition in mathematics—is nevertheless a phenomenon which has a real existence in Nature and is daily known to experience ; but that the means of putting it into practice are beyond normal human control. Nevertheless, I would go further and maintain that the human mind is capable of plumbing the secret of Nature ; and that, in sublime moments, this has been achieved. The mind of Jesus, which was in perfect harmony with the universe and in perfect unity with the mind of His Father, must have seen into the heart of Nature to an extent undreamt of by ordinary mortals ; and it is not too much to suggest that, if there are laws of multiplication at work in Nature which can hardly be denied in view of her ability to multiply, His eye might have penetrated to what most, if not all, other human sight has missed.

It is important to notice, in the Feeding of the Five Thousand, that Jesus did not produce bread and fish out of nothing—any more than at the marriage in Cana he produced wine out of nothing. In each case there was material upon which to work—in both cases an undeveloped potentiality awaited development. Had there been no water at Cana, and no bread or fish on the second occasion, there would have been no opportunity for miracle ; and I suggest that a third element was present—without which the supernatural springs which are at the root

of Nature would never have been brought into play by Jesus Christ. I do not mean to imply by this that an immoral miracle would be impossible. I can see no reason why an evil genius should be unable to get at the springs of Nature and exploit them for his own purpose, and I would even go so far as to suggest that a good deal in the phenomenon of black magic which strikes us as inexplicable at first becomes clearer in the light of such an argument ; but it is impossible to associate this type of exploitation with the moral perfection of Jesus. The temptations in the wilderness demonstrate quite clearly that He was conscious of these supernatural powers and of His ability to exploit them for His own purpose. There is no need to take the form of these temptations quite literally in order to realise this.

The walking of Jesus on the water is sometimes quoted as an instance of recorded miracle that would seem to answer no moral purpose ; but unless we are going to suppose that He was walking on the water for His own diversion, and met the Apostles in a storm by accident, the moral purport of this incident seems to me quite obvious. The disciples were in great distress and danger from the storm ; and, in their overwrought state of exhaustion which almost amounted to hysteria, were in peril of drowning. Jesus, who had been praying on the mountain, felt their need and instantly came to their rescue by the only means possible. He could not produce a boat from nothing because this would have violated certain principles of natural law, and it is likely that a stilling of the storm would only have increased the nervous tension on this occasion ; and so He went to them.

The problem does, of course, bristle with difficulties. We do not know of any means by which the bodies of men can violate the laws of gravity ; but we do know that water is a strange phenomenon whose origin is highly problematic and whose potentialities, if credible witnesses are to be believed, are unaccountable. Moreover, anyone who swims by any of the various strokes does, to that extent, defeat the law of gravitation ; and the animal who does so by instinct is the greatest marvel of them all. For the simple beast, whose wild life takes him into the water, knows that he can by the use of his limbs get across it ; and this fact, staggeringly simple as it is, is really the crux and the solution of the problem.

It is all, I suggest, a matter of degree. Beasts who fear the water go straight to the bottom of it ; but nobody supposes that this means that man was meant to go there. Such a belief would be absurd. God obviously intended His creation to lord it over the water as much as over the land ; but the beast or the man who does so does, by that very act, defeat the law of gravity. He does, of course, bring other laws into operation—laws that the scientist can easily explain ; but those laws would never have come to our knowledge had not some beasts, in a remote primeval age, made the experiment of kicking their feet, in the water to keep themselves above it !

Now the beast preserves himself in water by the method most natural to him—kicking the water in the same way that he kicks the air when he is upon land—the method that goes by the name of “ treading water.” That, we have seen, is admirable ; but man, instead of employing the method most natural to *him*, has preferred to remain at the level of the beast—to kick and to tread instead of to walk. He has used his reason instead of his instinct ; and the result so far as we can see is that he has a deal of trouble in learning the method and becomes easily exhausted when he has learnt it. Nevertheless, I dare

to suggest that man was never intended by God to flop about in the water on all fours—that, if he had taken to water as naturally as the beasts had taken to it, relying upon instinct for his guide, he might have discovered those unknown laws by which he could have defeated gravity without sinking to the level of the beast in order to do so. He might, in fact, have done any day of his life what Jesus did at the Lake of Galilee, and walked upon the water.

Now, of course, the art has been lost—or perhaps it would be truer to say that the hope of cultivating it has gone. The gradual accumulation of layer upon layer of reasonable activity has buried it deeper and deeper in the darkness of the unconscious—until nothing but an uprush of faith could release it. There seems to have been a moment when Peter experienced this uprush ; but it was short-lived enough. It may well be that man, in his present state of civilisation, is incapable of making the great act of faith that would enable him to walk upon the water ; but civilisation has unfortunately laid upon him a yet more blinding influence—a blindness in which he cannot see that Jesus knew the law of God better than all the scientists whose minds, as well as their bodies, are pulled down by gravity.

It would seem, in fact, that here is the key to the mystery of miracle—a key that is in the hands of those who, like the saints, see nearest to the mind of God and those who, at the other end, are in an undeveloped stage—a stage in which the primitive and the instinctive have never owned the sway of reason. We too readily assume, I think, the credulity of these people. Some of the medieval saints (such as St. Bernard and St. Xavier) were of as tough a mental fibre as any modern scientist whose world would sometimes seem to be no wider than a laboratory ; and both they and the savage at the other end of the miracle polarity would seem to have unsealed forces in themselves of which we of the twentieth century West are only dimly, if at all, aware.

In any discussion of miracles we naturally turn to the Gospel narratives for evidence—as these alone amid the literature of miracles have influenced the Western world ; and, in the narrow space of a short article, I have been able to do little more than touch even upon these. Some modern Christians would seem to be made a little uncomfortable by the presence of the miraculous in their religion, and others are even revolted by it ; but, to the world in which the Gospels appeared, these two attitudes would have seemed quite incomprehensible—a fact worth noting. Jesus never used a miracle as a means of creating faith—even if He could have done so ; but, provided the faith was there, He regarded all His miracles as a sign that He was acting in God's way to do God's work.

ASHLEY SAMPSON.

MALTA WON'T SINK.

NO, Malta won't sink, and the Germans have admitted it. It has been attacked from the sea, and pounded remorselessly from the air ; its historic buildings and monuments are in ruins, its narrow streets are blocked by immense piles of rock and debris ; some of its most famous churches, renowned throughout the world, now lie in heaps of broken stone and rubble. Perhaps, when the stones are cleared away, will be found the remains of men and women and children who had hoped to find sanctuary in their churches, for the Maltese are

deeply religious, and they have not realised yet that in the eyes of a German airman a church is a military target.

At the beginning of the war Malta was in a sad state of preparedness. Fortunate indeed it was that Italy restrained her hand for nine months, but even on that fateful June 11th, 1940, when bombs rained down upon the Maltese for the first time in history, the Island was still unprepared. The troops, both British and Maltese, were of course at their war stations, but some of these consisted of hastily dug trenches or roofless sandbagged posts. One company of British infantry, whose task was the defence of an aerodrome, lived in a quarry. The R.A.F. had three planes of an obsolete type to send up against the entire strength of the Italian air force. These three planes were nicknamed Faith, Hope and Charity, and the greatest of these was Faith.

Now, just over two years later, no country is better defended and better prepared to meet attack than Malta. The native population are massed in their own battalions of infantry and artillery, of which the King is now Colonel-in-Chief; the Malta Volunteer Defence Force—the Home Guard—are trained in modern methods of warfare; the branches of the civil defence, the police, the A.R.P., the firemen, ambulance men and nurses, rescue squads, demolition parties, all are thoroughly trained and highly efficient at their jobs, and have proved their worth on countless occasions.

Their efficiency has improved with experience. On that first day of active warfare on the Malta Front the civilian population behaved in much the same way as everyone else has done at the first attack. All sought shelter, all were excited, and their work became disorganised. Later, as they became more accustomed to the raids, so they became more oblivious to them, and their work continued without interruption. For six months the Maltese endured bombing attacks which were carried out at very high levels by the Italians. At such high altitudes the Italian airmen unloaded their bombs with amazing accuracy, and to their credit it must be said that most of their bombs fell on military targets. The Grand Harbour and the dockyards and the aerodromes were constantly bombed, though little damage was done, and the raiders were invariably engaged by Faith, Hope and Charity, and later by reinforcements of Hurricanes.

Then in December 1940 the mighty German Luftwaffe arrived in Sicily, less than sixty miles away, and they sent over occasional reconnaissance planes by way of introduction. In January the aircraft-carrier *Illustrious*, operating in the vicinity of Malta, was attacked without respite for many hours, and, badly crippled, limped into the Grand Harbour for repairs. On January 16th the Maltese witnessed the first mass dive-bombing attack by waves of Junkers 87's and 88's, an attack mainly directed at the *Illustrious*, but in the face of the tremendous anti-aircraft barrage put up by the gunners, most of the bombs did not fall on the ship. The damage was appalling, though fortunately the loss of life was not great, thanks to the numerous rock-shelters. More heavy raids followed, but in the face of the heaviest barrage in the world the dive-bombers were unable to get at the aircraft-carrier, which was patched up by the dockyard workers who displayed magnificent skill and devotion to their duty, and a few days later H.M.S. *Illustrious* slipped out of harbour and steamed away to safety.

Then the Luftwaffe concentrated their attacks on the aerodromes, one of which in particular was subjected to very heavy raids. I myself

watched these raids. I had to give a running commentary by telephone to my headquarters, and the following is typical of these attacks.

"From my post I could see various batteries of anti-aircraft guns pointing to the East, and I knew the attack would come from that direction. Sure enough it did. Through my binoculars I could see a swarm of planes approaching at about 14,000 feet, and I identified them as Junkers 87's. I reported the news to headquarters. They asked for approximate numbers, and I told them there must have been at least a hundred planes. I did manage to count 35 in the first wave, and there were several waves of them. As they approached closer the A.A. guns opened up, and little white puffs appeared amongst them. Then, when almost over the aerodrome, they circled and manœuvred into position before starting to dive. The A.A. fire was now intense and accurate, and I could not help admiring the apparent coolness of the German pilots as they sorted themselves out ready for their attack. Then down they came, five and six at a time, down almost perpendicular to about 8,000 feet, then a twist, then straight down again like a stone, down to about 1,000 feet or less; then just as they pulled out of their dive, they released their bombs, straightened out, and, instead of climbing again, they flew across the Island at a very low level, twisting and turning as they endeavoured to avoid the strings of Bofors shells and tracer bullets from machine-guns which criss-crossed and rushed up at them from every direction. It seemed impossible for a single plane to escape that curtain of fire. All the time more planes were diving down on the aerodrome, and the noise was terrific. The guns roared almost continuously, bombs were exploding amongst the hangars and on the airfield, and the tearing crescendo of the engines as the planes dived down was literally deafening. Down they came, still more of them, these madmen of the skies, diving, twisting, turning, and diving again, straight through the most concentrated barrage ever put up over the Island, down almost on to the aerodrome itself, so low that the pilots could be seen in their cock-pits. It was at this low level that they flew across the fields after dropping their bombs, and many were unable to escape the barrage. Our own fighters shot down many of them in flames, and many of those that did escape and managed to reach their base must have done so with some of the crew dead in their seats."

Yes, the Maltese had to endure much, but they were more determined than ever that theirs would never be a German-occupied land. The threat of invasion, heralded by the mass dive-bombing attacks, loomed large in their minds; and anti-invasion and anti-parachutist exercises were carried out daily by the British and Maltese troops.

Meanwhile their work continued, though it was badly disorganised again. Many of the people "went to earth" permanently in the wonderful rock shelters, and the construction of more shelters was greatly accelerated. These shelters, some of which were hewn out of the rock more than three hundred years ago by the Knights of St. John, have proved one of the blessings and marvels of the Island. Here beneath the surface of the earth the people lived and worked and slept, and the children went to school, and the priests held their services in complete immunity from the blast and destruction of a thousand bombs.

The raids continued, and heavy toll was taken of the raiders. They came by day, and they came by night, and they dropped bombs on Valetta, the capital of Malta. Many famous buildings were badly damaged, including the beautiful St. John's Co-Cathedral and the

Palace. The main shopping centre was smashed in one night ; so were the cinemas, churches, public buildings and private houses.

Then quite suddenly, after weeks of continual night attacks, there was a lull. The Luftwaffe, not so mighty now, left their base in Sicily for some other front, perhaps the Russian Front, and Malta was left to tend its wounds. Not left alone entirely, for the Italians still sent over their bombers and fighters, but after the mass raids of the Luftwaffe the Regia Aeronautica was looked upon with contempt.

So Malta cared for its wounds, and gradually the debris was cleared, some of the shops that were not ruined completely were patched up and re-opened, " bombed but not beaten " signs were posted up everywhere, and the more normal life of the townsfolk and the villagers was resumed. The troops took advantage of the glorious summer weather and indulged in much bathing in the beautiful clear water. But even the joys of swimming were tempered somewhat by the knowledge of the constant dangers to bathers.

The comparatively quiet spell was broken early one morning. The air-raid alarm had sounded, though this in itself was nothing unusual, and the searchlights probed the sky, but not only the sky ; the sea on the north side of Malta was swept too by the coastal defence lights, and it was apparent that some sort of attack was developing from the sea. Suddenly the coastal batteries went into action, and watchers on the bastions overlooking the Grand Harbour saw red and green tracer shells being fired out to sea. For some minutes the guns continued firing, and a vivid explosion some distance off the coast proclaimed a direct hit on an enemy vessel. Then another explosion, and another followed in quick succession. It was clear that there were several ships attempting to launch an attack, and the gunners shelled them incessantly for a considerable time. The coloured shells could be seen hitting the sea, then bouncing once, sometimes twice, like pebbles thrown across a pond. Several more explosions occurred, and as the dawn gradually paled the darkness of the night, R.A.F. fighters took up the attack, and machine-gunned the vessels that could now be seen from the coast. They were E-boats and curious torpedo-craft which were apparently manned and steered on their course by Italian suicide-squads. And suicide-squads they certainly were. There were seventeen boats altogether. Not one of them escaped. What a complete failure this first sea-attack proved to be, and what supreme confidence it gave to the defenders of Malta ! Malta could take it, yes, and Malta could hit back too ! A sharper thorn in the side of the Axis surely never existed than this brave little Island which Mussolini had boasted would be his within a fortnight, and which the Luftwaffe strove to smash early in 1941. They strove again in 1942, and they smashed the churches and the hospitals and the historic buildings of Valetta. But they couldn't smash the courage of the people. Well and truly have they earned the unique award of the George Cross.

Yet, throughout its long siege, despite its incessant air-alarms, and the number is approaching 3,000, Malta has not only been on the defensive, but has also been an active base for offensive operations. From the beginning its submarines have patrolled the Mediterranean, and many enemy supply ships and warships, indeed whole convoys, have been sunk by them. The R.A.F., too, have struck, and struck hard, from the Malta aerodromes at enemy objectives which surround the Island.

Malta is indeed a tough nut which won't crack. Its defenders,

British and Maltese, have stood up defiantly to the worst the enemy can do, and its tales of courage and heroism would fill volumes. Perhaps the highest tribute of all comes from the Germans themselves, when they say that Malta won't sink. No, just as they failed to sink H.M.S. *Illustrious*, so they have failed to sink H.M.S. *Malta*. Malta, G.C., won't sink.

JOHN R. NEWMARK.

THE PANAMA CANAL AND ITS DEFENCE.

A CONSIDERABLE number of ships have been recently torpedoed in the Caribbean Sea, between the Greater Antilles—Cuba, Haiti and Puerto Rico—and Central America. The control of this sea is not only necessary for the defence of the Panama Canal from the east, but its bases would be required for repelling any attack, from Dakar or elsewhere, launched against Latin South America. It is even conceivable that the Canal might be threatened simultaneously by Germany from the Middle and South Atlantic and Japan from the Pacific. In South America suspicion exists that some relation exists between the U-boat attacks and Vichy-controlled French Guiana, which has been fully mobilised. This Colony is, however, largely controlled from Martinique, where the United States have taken steps to forestall any Axis aggression.

The primary reason for the construction of the Canal was to facilitate transport of the American fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific, avoiding the long journey round Cape Horn, a tremendous advantage now that the United States has enemies both in Europe and in Asia. But it has other strategic interests and considerable commercial value. An all-sea route exists from Vancouver and San Francisco to the Atlantic coast. Australia and New Zealand are now nearer to New York than to London, while the Canal provides the shortest route from Great Britain to New Zealand, and an important alternative one to Australia. The nitrates of Chile and the metals of Peru can be brought by a quick sea route to the manufacturing cities of New England, which is now on an equality, in normal trade relations, with Western Europe in supplying the countries of Eastern Asia.

The Canal cost £100 million to construct, was finished in 1914 and officially opened for traffic in 1920. The "Canal Zone," five miles wide on either side, is under the jurisdiction of the United States, who guaranteed the independence of the Panama Republic in 1936. It is 553 square miles in area, and includes the great Gatun Lake of 163 square miles. Unlike the Suez Canal, which is cut through flat land, the terrain is very hilly, necessitating the use of three locks at either end. The Gatun Lake is 85 feet above sea level and surrounded by jungle. It is approached from the Atlantic side by a cut through swamps, and three tiers of double locks, allowing ships to pass each other, are needed for lifting and lowering. At its broadest, the lake is $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, and the level of its water is maintained by the Gatun Dam, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles long, 100 feet wide at the top and 400 at the water surface.

From the Atlantic side the Canal is entered from Limon Bay and the port of Colon, where there is a dry dock 300 feet long and 48 wide. Next to it the Americans have built Christobel, for the Caribbean and

South American trade. After the Gatun Lake, the Canal is continued by the Culebra Cut, a gorge, partly hewn out of solid rock, 8 miles long, 300 feet wide and 40 feet deep. Then one set of locks lowers vessels to the Meraflres Lake, and at the Pacific end two further tiers let them down to the canalised bed of Rio Grande at sea level. A third series of locks is being constructed away from the present ones, for military security. No vessel can pass through under its own power, but six locomotives, or "electric mules," are used to tow it. These climb steep inclines by cog-wheeled tracks between the tiers of locks. There are contact towers above each set and the engineers in control are supplied with working models of the locks, with the position of each vessel passing through. From ocean to ocean the distance is about forty-one miles, and the passage takes between seven and eight hours. The traffic capacity is estimated at forty-eight ships a day or 1,700 a year. The largest ships can pass through the Canal, and the repair facilities are ample. Both Colon, at the northern end, and Panama, at the southern, have coaling and oil pumping plant. A railway crosses the isthmus, but no road. Both entrances are heavily fortified. Forts guard the locks and aerial forces are maintained by both the Army and Navy. At the Atlantic end is a submarine base.

The majority of the Atlantic naval and air bases leased to the United States are just outside the Caribbean and form its outer defences. Sweeping round from the south of Florida, with its great naval base at Key West, is a great screen of small islands extending as far as Trinidad. The advance post for the defence of the Florida Strait is the 600-mile long chain of the Bahamas, which also commands the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti. The Mona Passage, between Haiti and Puerto Rico, is protected by the American base of San Juan on the north coast of the latter. The Lesser Antilles—the Virgin, Leeward and Windward Islands—form a further chain of 700 miles. Antigua and St. Lucia are leased. The French islands of Martinique and Guadelope occur in this chain, but they can easily be controlled from Antigua, Dominica or St. Lucia. Possibly the most important base leased is Trinidad, which is just off the Venezuelan coast, and can be used for operations north or south. It is now being developed as a great air station, as it is the pivot of lines from West Africa, Cape Town, Lisbon and the Amazon. Besides that, it has an important function in supplying and sheltering naval and merchant vessels. The Gulf of Paria behind the island is nearly landlocked, and could take all the navies in the world. Trinidad has its own self-contained oil industry, the largest in the British Empire. That of Venezuela ranks in world production after that of the United States, though, of course, a long way behind it. Refineries for this oil exist in the Dutch Islands of Curaçoa and Aruba, east of Trinidad and on the Goajira Peninsula, on the Columbian-Venezuelan border. All these have been threatened or attacked by German submarines.

All these new American bases are over 1,000 miles from Panama. The inner defence of the Caribbean is mainly concentrated west of the Windward Passage, where the United States' base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba has now been reinforced by the lease of the fine harbour at Kingston, Jamaica. Kingston is 600 miles from Colon, and forces based there could operate against attacks from the north-east, south-east, or north-west.

On the Pacific side of the Canal, the coast has no screen of protective islands. The Gulf of Panama itself is about 120 miles wide and 150 long.

Inside it, the small group of the Pearl Islands is protection for the Canal entrance, while the coast of Columbia has a large number of indented bays fringed by the Santa Marta Mountains rising to 10,000 feet and perpetual snow. Outside the Gulf, the nearest islands are the Galapagos, 1,000 miles away. These belong to Ecuador, and it is believed that the United States have come to some arrangement about them. Distances to other American bases in the Pacific are immense. It is 4,700 miles to Pearl Harbour and 3,240 to San Francisco, and it appears that any attack on the Canal from the west would be met by American forces based on these or on Panama itself.

G. M. COOMBS.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

EAST AND WEST.

THE focusing of interest and speculation upon Germany's drive at the Caucasus has given a new currency to the sort of belief that underlay Kipling's famous differentiation between the East and the West. What is Germany really driving at? What is Japan driving at; and what is the relation between the two? Turkish opinion, which sees the German avalanche nearing her borders and which dare not miscalculate nor yield to self-deception, has already foreseen a culminating clash between German and Japanese ambitions. Turkish views on this matter, though they may be wrong (the most likely thing in the world is that we shall all be proved wrong), carry weight because they result from a close study of urgent realities. To British minds, the upshot of this summer's events in Southern Russia is of an almost equally urgent interest. We assume that Hitler, who still wields the strategic initiative, and who still calls the tune to which the world dances, really has a plan. We may find, sooner than most of us expect, that coherence of plan or intelligence in the motive are the last things of which Hitler is capable; and we may find that, even granted coherence and intelligence in his military strategy, his power to carry out the plan is already undermined in the devastated provinces of his former victories. But we assume a present plan.

Does Hitler want the Caucasian oil as well as the Ukrainian wheat? It is believed in competent quarters, neutral as well as Allied, that his synthetic oil production is itself equal to his military needs; and even transport problems would not be greatly or immediately eased by his possession of the Caucasian oilfields. Does he then aim merely at the negative object of cutting off Russia from the essential products of the Ukraine and the Caucasus? Or is his object at all costs to reach the Persian Gulf so as to isolate Russia from all possibility of Allied supplies from the Middle East? The latter theory has many advocates. But the interesting thing is that hardly any informed student of these possibilities believes that Hitler's object is to make contact with the Japanese. The chief sources of such guidance as we can get in forming an opinion on that matter are the views of the neutrals, in particular Turkish and Spanish, and the naïve propaganda of the Goebbels office in Berlin. It is well for us to remember that at the present time we ourselves are not in direct touch with either German or Japanese thought. We have to put two and two together (hoping that our

arithmetic will be right) and to read between the lines of the enemy's press.

But a man like Señor Suñer is in direct personal touch with the Axis leaders. A report has reached Britain, through a reliable channel, that Señor Suñer has come to the conclusion, and claims to know that the German leaders themselves have come to the conclusion, that Germany cannot win the war, and that his own money, so to speak, formerly staked upon a German victory is lost. Why? Germany's military strength seems to be not smaller, but greater than ever. She has been able to renew her offensive against Russia on the vastest scale of military operations ever experienced in the history of man, and at the same time has sunk enough British and American shipping to make "the second front"—though the tactic of such a front be clearly indicated on strategic grounds, and the performance has been openly promised to Russia—so difficult a venture that the summer months have almost passed without the promise being substantiated. The second front may still, this late summer or this autumn, be launched; but the fact that it was not launched in the spring, when its potential effectiveness was at its greatest, is the proof of Germany's world-wide fighting strength, on land, on sea and in the air. Yet even in these circumstances no wise man, least of all in Germany, can feel confident that the appearance is not deceptive. We know, for instance, that despite the still ebullient German supply of tanks, guns, fuel, aircraft, bombs and even men, the very foundations of the Third Reich are fast deteriorating. Food, medical supplies, railway transport are all known to be the source of gnawing, if unconfessed, anxiety to the German leaders; and the loss of man-power on the eastern front is the most important single thing that is happening there. After all, a house whose foundations have been undermined looks all right up to the very moment of collapse. A rocket is at its highest just before it comes down.

If Señor Suñer's present views be rightly reported, what has caused the change? The answer in two words is to be found in the occupied countries; and the final force that is known to have driven home the disillusion in the minds of the German leaders is the contrast offered by the Japanese experience. We in Britain do not directly know the facts of Japan's experience in Siam, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, the Philippines. An American Jesuit, who escaped from the Philippines after the Japanese occupation, has stated that the occupying authorities had so far respected the Church and its personnel, and the practice of the Christian religion, and had made no attempt to impose a Shinto alternative. An American nurse has stated that in the Bataan hospitals, before she left, Mass was said daily, and all the Sacraments were administered. But we have no other direct evidence. By contrast Axis and neutral sources are so much more fully informed, that the German leaders are now said to be convinced, to their own mortification, that the Japanese Government has done what the German Government has spectacularly not done, namely, has made it a first principle of its policy to cultivate the good will of the peoples of the occupied countries.

So remarkable is the contrast between the German and the Japanese record that Spanish politicians of all shades of opinion are openly declaring that in 1942, as in 1918, Germany is beaten by her own victories. It is too late for Germany now to reverse her policy. She believed—and herein is to be detected still another manifestation of

the abiding truth that brute physical force cannot ever do anything but defeat its own object—that her overwhelming weight of tanks and bombers would crush all resistance in the countries occupied, and would be the decisive factor. Need it cause any surprise that so stupid a belief was actually held? The Germans as a race present a puzzling paradox. They have great qualities, spiritual as well as intellectual. Politically they plunge from one blunder into another. Even their experience of 1918 was not enough to convince them that, though it is indisputably true that they can produce an army and equipment unmatched in fighting efficiency by any other country, they cannot thereby achieve either empire abroad or security at home. Material means can affect material things. They cannot touch spiritual things. How is it that the German people, so efficient, so clever, so disciplined, are incapable of recognising the most obvious of all truths? It is precisely because they are so clever. They are indeed beaten by their own victories. They are so efficient that they put their faith in themselves, instead of in the only source of all human well-being, namely in the Grace of God: “because every one that exalteth himself shall be humbled, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted,” as Our Lord said in His parable “to some who trusted in themselves as just.” The Germans now fear that the enmity of the occupied countries in Europe is the lasting and the decisive thing. It cannot now be altered. What is the good of their tanks? Can their tanks be stationed all over Europe for ever? And even if they could, would the German object be thereby achieved? It is not in human nature for the German troops of occupation to steal out at night, every night, for an indefinite future, peering round every corner and wondering whence the next assassin’s bullet will come.

No event in this war has been more important than the assassination of Heydrich. He was not only Himmler’s right-hand man. He was indispensable to Himmler. Consider the circumstances. Czechoslovakia has suffered a longer and more thorough crushing at Germany’s hands than any country in Europe. The process started six months before the war started. Heydrich’s personal security was a chief concern of that efficient machine, the German armed forces, operating in a disarmed country. Yet he was fatally attacked in the streets of Prague on May 27th last. What did that mean? It meant that despite the relentless supervision of the armed German organisation, there was in existence, undetected by the Germans, a vast counter-organisation which day and night, month after month, could dispose armed Czechs throughout the country, on the look out for their opportunity. To catch Heydrich on the hop, so to speak, was like finding a needle in a haystack. Yet they found it. That very fact proved both the extent and the boldness of the Czech organisation. Yet the Gestapo could find no trace of its headquarters. They executed hundreds of Czechs in a spirit of vengeance. They arrested hundreds of Czech men and women they had reason to suspect of complicity. They applied to them the third degree, with the help of that famous drug (Scopolamine), beloved of the modern oppressor, which paralyses the critical faculty and makes its victims blurt out everything he knows; but the arrested Czechs themselves did not know. They did not know their own superior officers. They knew only the next man.

When the Gestapo, as a result of the thorough research of which that machine is capable, did discover that the headquarters of the Czech organisation was to be found in the obscure village of Lidice, near

Kladno, they descended upon it swiftly and silently, only to find that the prey had fled and had left behind not a single paper. The Czech espionage was a move ahead of the German. That was why the village was razed to the ground: an act of impotent rage on the part of a victorious beaten nation. The very name of the village was deleted from the official records. The Germans wildly announced that the village had been wiped out because, in addition to "assisting those who had perpetrated the shooting of Heydrich, the population had also committed other hostile acts, such as keeping an illegal dump of ammunition and arms, and maintaining an illegal wireless transmitter and an extraordinarily large quantity of goods which are controlled." Yet to this day the ringleaders are undetected, are at large, and are pursuing their grim work. They are known neither in Moscow nor in London, nor anywhere outside Czechoslovakia. Edward Beneš does not know who are these resourceful, desperate, efficient Czech officers who, against all the odds, are beating the Gestapo.

The Heydrich episode is symbolic of what is happening throughout Europe. The French people, for instance, publish their underground newspapers, and their underground bulletins of acts of sabotage committed against the enemy. Every form of control, of power resulting from a "crushing" victory is at the disposal of the German authorities. They have practised it during more than two years of occupation. They have disarmed, labelled, catalogued, pigeon-holed and starved every French man, woman and child in the country: yet these French people are executing and planning bold deeds under the very noses of the startled Germans.

Do the German people even now as a whole not appreciate the lesson twice proved to them in living experience? Still more surprisingly, the German leaders, who not only have the same experience to guide them, but ought also to remember their own predecessors' experience, seem to be incapable of learning either by their experience or by the advice given them by their own kin. In his new book, *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Dr. Gooch recalls Bismarck's warning to that obstinate people (1885): "... we have taken too much French territory. Could we aspire to conquests at the expense of France, Belgium, or Holland? They would be recalcitrant nations. Looking all round our frontiers, every gain would be a loss, every increase a cause for weakness." Defeat in victory is the lesson written large in modern German history. Yet a clever people cannot see it, seduced from wisdom by cleverness. "Big words spoken by the insolent," observed the wise Chorus at the end of Sophocles' *Antigone*, "are punished by big blows, which in old age teach us to be wise." The Germans are still politically young; and the process of their chastisement involves the rest of mankind. The British political evolution has already reached the prescribed "old age" of the Greek tragedian's doctrine.

Whatever be the faults—chief among them the smug, complacent superiority complex—of British imperialism in the past, there has remained with us a saving gift of graceful accommodation to proved necessity, and of graceful advance with the times, as was brilliantly exemplified by Lord Balfour in 1926. At the imperial conference held in that year, a committee chairmaned by him gave a written definition to inter-imperial relations as then virtually decided by the march of time. Lord Balfour's masterpiece, a monument to the British political genius at its best, thus defined the "position and

mutual relation" of Great Britain and her former "dominions": "They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . Every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever." Could an Empire be more gloriously given up, and thereby saved? Yet a seamy side still remained.

There still remained the problem of the "backward," chiefly eastern, peoples who contributed their natural wealth to the riches of the British people, and in return received the professed, and in some degree real, blessing of British rule. India, Burma, Malaya, to-day are writing the troubled epitaph to that particular aspect of an imperialist tradition which based its ethics upon the supposedly inherent superiority of one race over another, upon the theory of what the Germans call the *Herrenvolk*. It is the lingering anachronism of British, American, Dutch and pre-1940 French imperialism in the Far East that has given the Japanese their present opportunity. The Japanese are at least "yellow." They are an eastern people who have a ready-made approach to eastern peoples. We have talked about a "fifth column" in Singapore and elsewhere when the white races almost overnight have seen the very ground crumble beneath their feet. What is to be the real verdict of history upon the Japanese part in this historic separation of the white races from the yellow, of Kipling's west from Kipling's east? We talk of Japanese aggression in the East, as of German aggression in the West. Already we know enough, little though it be, to make us hesitate before committing ourselves to too sweeping a judgment upon events than which history offers none more portentous. Let us not make of ourselves a pompous laughing-stock in the minds of the "inferior" yellow races, who in conformity with the slow evolution of all God's creatures, do grow up. What is happening in the east to-day is in its fashion as characteristic of human vicissitude, of human insolence and nemesis and resultant balance, as is the German performance in Europe.

It is not in one sense surprising that the Japanese have apparently succeeded in doing among the eastern peoples what the Germans have failed to do among the European peoples. The latter really are more advanced politically than the former. The Germans have no luck in the sense that their urge to dominate and exploit subject peoples is in present circumstances confined in scope to politically adult races who will resist such exploitation to the last. The Japanese have to deal with peoples who have had no other experience as yet than that of exploitation. There is indisputable proof that the people of Burma were ripe for the exercise of Japanese appeals to "yellow" prejudice against "white" exploitation. The Burmese to-day are fighting in the armed forces of Japan. They have welcomed Japanese help in their "liberation" from white domination. Mr. F. Burton Leach, it is true, former Chief Secretary to the Government of Burma, has in THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW expressed the opinion that Burmese feeling was less anti-British than anti-Indian, and blamed the British for having allowed half the land in Lower Burma to pass into the hands of Indians. Such an argument is hardly convincing. It may have been a contributory, but could hardly have been the main, factor in the Japanese approach to Burmese feeling. The case of Thailand, where

the Japanese "fifth column" was equally effective, calls for a more radical explanation, and gives the general clue. The dredging of Thai tin for British owners was as much a lever to Japanese hands as were the oil wells of Burma and the rubber plantations of Malaya.

The real difference between the German and the Japanese experience is one of timing. The Germans are too late in the history of the world to subjugate European peoples who have known sovereign independence. The Japanese have caught the eastern peoples on the rebound from white domination; but on the rebound from what essential thing? The emphasis must be placed on domination, not on the epithet "white." It is precisely the nature of the Japanese opportunity in the Far East that will militate against the Japanese themselves in due course. Are the Japanese wise enough—wiser than the Germans—to have foreseen this? In other words, what is the true Japanese purpose? History as yet cannot tell. They have declared that their purpose is to drive the white races from the East. Germany's "new order" in Europe by contrast can only parade the bogeys of British interference and of Russian bolshevism: bogeys which are not effective enough for Germany's purpose.

Little surprise can be caused by the carping jealousy with which the Goebbels propaganda office has lately been criticising the Japanese "new order." Much space has lately been given in the German Press to the Japanese Grossraum in South-East Asia, the burden of the argument being the "difficulties" that the Japanese are having to face. It is pointed out in the first place that Japan is so short of shipping that the Japanese official spokesmen themselves have had to warn the Japanese people not to count on any sudden improvement in their standard of life as a result of imports from the conquered south. The *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* (May 26th) pointed out that Japan began the war with 5.6 million tons of shipping, and estimated that she needs 15 million tons if she is to succeed in organising the newly conquered territories into a prosperous economic unit. *Angriff* (May 28th) gave prominence to the report that on May 27th the Diet in Tokyo concentrated upon the passing of laws to alleviate the shipping shortage. The *Kölnische Zeitung* (July 17th) argued that the Japanese shipping problem could not quickly be solved, and that the best thing that could be said about it was that the whole Japanese people were taking it seriously and among other expedients were salvaging sunken ships. There was an unmistakably apolaustic tone in the German emphasis upon Japanese difficulties. Moreover, the Germans seldom do things by halves. They have a grim knack of going straight to the point. In the present case, what really rankled was Japan's success in winning, not only the tolerance, but the welcoming good will, of the occupied peoples. Therefore, the German Press was mobilised by Goebbels to cast doubt upon the Japanese achievement. The object partly, no doubt, to give a little left-handed comfort to the German people by telling them that they were not the only failures in the art of managing conquered peoples.

The Press dutifully did what Goebbels ordered: not subtly (for that is never the German way), but with the characteristic technique of frontal attack. In short, it was declared that the Japanese were meeting with serious difficulties in their attempts to win the cordial collaboration of the people in South-East Asia. The evidence? The Germans are a logical people. Logic, however, is the least reliable of all intellectual gifts, because two and two never make four except in arithmetic;

and who cares about arithmetic? But the Germans are logical. Having stated bluntly that the Japanese have failed in a certain venture, they go on to provide the evidence, just as a panzer break-through is followed by the hordes of advancing infantry. The evidence collected was presumably good enough to bemuse the German people, whose intellectual equipment oddly enough does not include a critical appreciation of comparative values. The Japanese Press was solemnly quoted as having admitted that such southern peoples as the Papuans would have to be raised to a level capable of appreciating Japanese culture. The *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* (July 17th) added that one feature of Japanese culture which the Filipinos could not understand was that work was carried on without a break for seven days in the week. The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* (May 20th) observed with an unmistakable air of surprise that according to the Japanese Press, Japan proposed to rely chiefly upon a humane policy to win the confidence of the people of South-East Asia: an odd tactic because obviously the only effective way to win people's confidence is to shoot some of them *pour encourager les autres*.

The crowning gem of this German essay in wishful thinking was the statement (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, July 17th) that the Japanese were unable to pay in yen for the tin and other commodities they needed from Thailand, and were therefore forced, under the terms of the economic agreement concluded with that country, to offer canned fish and fruit, textiles, paper, pencils and celluloid toys in exchange. Now those Japanese products are precisely what Thailand most needs. They play an important part in her economic life. What other use could be made of Japanese yen than to buy Japanese products? There could be no better illustration of the depths of folly to which a clever people, such as are the German people, can fall.

To us, however, the interesting thing in it is the suggestion that German opinion, dejected by Germany's failure to win the allegiance of Europe to so great a blessing as German culture, is casting green and envious eyes upon Japan's contrasting success in winning the allegiance of the East. The Japanese opportunity in the East is, however, of a temporary and special kind. It rides the crest of a wave in the historic process of yellow liberation from white domination. Japan promises India freedom from British rule. If she thinks thereby to substitute Japanese rule, she makes a blunder greater than any committed by Germany. As the white peoples of Europe will never submit to the white domination of Germany, so the yellow peoples of the East will never submit to the yellow domination of Japan. The clue to what is happening is that the subject peoples everywhere are throwing off their yoke. The White Man's Burden, one of the bitter jests of history, is lifted: lifted from the shoulders of the exploited peoples. There is not likely to be a Yellow Man's Burden.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 11th, 1942.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT.*

Dr. Barker combines in an unusually high degree the qualifications of a historian with those of a philosopher. Hence his *Reflections on Government* show on the one hand an intimate acquaintance with the course of world affairs, and on the other hand a profound appreciation of the fundamental principles embodied in the institutions developed during the process of history. The present volume, the mature product of his long experience as a student and teacher, is based on a series of lectures delivered in 1933 at the University College of Aberystwyth. It is easy to see that the scope of the volume has been materially enlarged by the movement of events during the intervening years. The lectures originally dealt with democracy, its principles, its difficulties, its dangers, its machinery. Under the stress of totalitarianism and war they have developed into a masterly study of the respective merits and defects of democracy and dictatorship.

The first three sections of the book treat of democracy, the supreme merit of which in Dr. Barker's view is that, better than any other method of government, it conserves and gives play to the freedom of the individual. It allows every citizen to have a share in the government ; it thus elevates, enlarges his interests, and so educates him ; it renders progress stable ; it enables peaceful changes to be effected, thus obviating violent revolution ; it stimulates the formation of political parties. Dr. Barker's defence of the party system is wholehearted, impressive, and conclusive. These merits of democracy, however, are offset by serious defects, many of which have been glaringly evident during the nine years wherein these lectures have been under revision. Successful democracy postulates, on the part of the individual citizen, honesty, public spirit, and good will, as well as a certain measure of education and political sense ; on the part of the community as a whole it postulates a real solidarity, together with the possession of a communal conscience and a general will. Thus democracy fails to work properly if electors seek by means of their votes to secure personal or sectional interests ; in particular, any sort of a " class war " is fatal to its effective operation. The lack of these essentials of successful democracy accounts for the collapse of the Kerensky régime in Russia, of Facta's government in Italy, of the Weimar republic in Germany.

In the fourth and last section Dr. Barker deals with the totalitarian alternatives to discredited democracy set up in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. It would be difficult to find anywhere a more sane and balanced estimate of these systems. He freely admits that the democracies which they superseded were obviously defective : that they failed to provide strong and good government ; failed to lay down clear lines of policy ; failed to attain either firm decision or prompt action. Equally freely does he admit the merits that the dictatorships display, particularly in the sphere of action. In time of emergency they show a swiftness and secrecy of decision, and a vigour in execution, that stand in sharp contrast to the slow, divided, and hesitant verbiage of a parliamentary constitution. But over against these merits they have, in Dr. Barker's opinion, the fatal defects that they are destructive to freedom of all sorts ; that they are cruel, ruthless, unscrupulous, warlike ; that they produce a passive servile type of character ; that they lose touch with public opinion ; that they are liable to corruption and decay ; that they provide no rule of succession ; that they contain no means for constitutional change ; that they therefore tend to violent innovation, and so lack the element of permanence.

Dr. Barker's massive and scholarly work in defence of government by discussion and persuasion, with all its defects, as against government by force and suppression, with all its immediate advantages, is most timely and valuable.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

* *Reflections on Government.* By Ernest Barker. Oxford University Press. 21s.

KING ALFONSO.*

When I first came to Madrid, in 1933, some two years after Don Alfonso's overthrow, the only tokens of the Spanish monarchy which the people still seemed to cherish were the silver *Duros*, 5 peseta coins with the effigy of Spain's last king. It is possible that to-day the army is longing for the restoration of the monarchy as the best way of putting an end to internal dissensions; but I question Mr. Sencourt's assertion that when the news of King Alfonso's death became known in Spain "the people, still hungering and ill at ease, looked back with a feeling of repentance no less than of sorrow on the tranquil years when he had reigned with his parliaments and, after those broke down, without them." Mr. Sencourt makes no secret of his esteem for the late King and for some of the principles he upheld. But even those students of Spanish affairs who like myself view the King from a different angle cannot but be interested in the general approach to his subject and in his portrayal. He shows the crown on a background of democracy versus fascism and makes it clear that its wearer's mental make-up was unequal to the momentous struggle. He does not conceal that the King in turn succeeded in driving all his supporters into the opposition camp—" 'Who can trust him?' asked the Spanish leaders"; nor does he hide too many blots of his character. In fact, the attentive reader must soon realise how rare a specimen this king was in whose veins Hapsburg and Spanish soldiers' blood mingled; a mixture of a Spanish *Flamenco* and an Austrian *Feschak*. Both types are unthinkable in English and the names are untranslatable; yet a glimpse of their spiritual attitude can be gained from King Alfonso's praise of dictatorship in Spain: "There is no country where the police are less of a nuisance. You can drink after midnight any liquor you like, which I defy you to do in London or New York, those homes of liberty. At Madrid you can cry, howl or sing, if that pleases you, till five in the morning. The things changed are that one can go about with money in one's pocket and yet not risk being knocked out."

It is regrettable that Mr. Sencourt does not go deeper into the problem of Don Alfonso's complicity in the defeat of Anual in Morocco and of how far the king was instrumental in the setting up of a dictatorship just when a Parliamentary committee, the Picasso Commission, was about to investigate his guilt. The Spanish version of the fashionable sequel: War Guilt—Defeat—Dictatorship, is definitely a matter for research to any student of current affairs. There even was a *Reichstag* fire in Spain; for shortly after the dictator had assumed power, a mysterious fire in the Senate building conveniently destroyed the Picasso documents. But Mr. Sencourt, it seems, is less afraid of dictatorships, provided they are in keeping with Catholic principles, than of socialist ideas. Those parts of his book that deal with Socialism, Communism and Anarchism in Spain and elsewhere, particularly in Russia, are rather biased and in addition betray ignorance of some of the most elementary facts. To him all three stand indistinguishably for murder and destruction, warfare against civilisation, decency and religion with freemasonry as their common inspiration. Such views are the daily currency of fascism on which he in fact looks with a very benevolent eye.

ERNEST BOCK.

PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN.†

It is now widely realised that a just and reasonable settlement of the Central European problem forms one of the most important tasks of the future. The historical, economic and social factors involved, however, are very complicated, and have, moreover, been much confused and obscured by the conflicting tendencies of unscrupulous propaganda of different

* *King Alfonso*. By Robert Sencourt. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.

† *Problems of the Danube Basin*. By C. A. Macartney. Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.

nations living in or near the Danubian area. Mr. Macartney has already in other books shown a master-hand in disentangling many of the problems of this area, often reaching conclusions which greatly differ from the views prevalent in this country. Even in points which may be disputed his criticism cleared the road for a deeper understanding. In particular, he has done much to evoke a certain sympathetic understanding for the rather unpopular case of the Magyars. His appreciation of conditions in old Austria is certainly more adequate than usual among English post-war writers, though he could hardly avoid all the innumerable pitfalls created by the political ideologies of ten or eleven warring nationalities. It is scarcely correct to state that in the old Empire the differences between the social classes were immense, that the bourgeoisie were a political power only in Vienna, and the peasants and workers nowhere. The social and political structure of the Austrian group of countries, at least, was much more democratic than is assumed by the majority of writers who have no personal experience of those days. Mr. Macartney also seems somewhat to underestimate the economic progress made in Austria-Hungary in the last decades before the Great War. He doubts whether general standards were rising at all, and seems to accept the view of Hungarian nationalists who wanted to disrupt the economic unity by a customs barrier round Hungary. I have shown in one of my books that in the last ten years before the war Austrian industries developed perceptually as quickly as in Germany, though the absolute figures were much more modest. The national income grew very considerably. The most competent Hungarian economist, Professor Frederick de Fellner, calculated that the national income of Hungary developed from 1901 to 1913 by not less than 110 per cent., though, of course, the rise in prices must be allowed for. On the whole, however, Mr. Macartney's presentation of the Danubian problems forms a remarkable contribution to the literature on this subject and cannot be too warmly recommended.

FREDERICK HERTZ.

THE VICHY EXPERIMENT.*

Colonel Tissier's book is a scathing and documented denunciation of the defeatists and traitors of Vichy who have neither the legal nor the moral right to speak and act in the name of France. "In reality the armistice was not signed because it was the least unfavourable solution for France. Those who took the responsibility on themselves believed that the stab in the back they were administering to Great Britain would force her to give up the struggle. They were turning a reparable military reverse into a complete and final defeat of the Allies. This defeat was indispensable for the achievement of their calculated plans. The enemies of the Third Republic, the enemies of democratic institutions, could overthrow both only through defeat. With the men of Vichy hatred for the régime silenced their love for France." Pétain, though not a traitor, is a tool of traitors, and his pitiable record is attributed to his natural pessimism and the weakness of old age. The abject surrender brought no rewards to France, where the policy of collaboration is merely a formula covering the ruthless exploitation of a hungry people. As if the armistice was not bad enough, the conquerors are always trying by blackmail to push the Vichy Government beyond its limits.

Colonel Tissier, now Comptroller to the Free French forces and Legal Adviser to the Legislative Committee of Free France, is a good democrat, but he realises how far the practice of the Third Republic lagged behind the ideals of parliamentary self-government. France, he declares, desired a general cleaning-up, a purge of the administration, an abatement of the scandalous corruption revealed in the Stavisky and similar affairs. Everyone felt that something must be done, and in 1940, when the military collapse further discredited the old institutions, the nation was ready for drastic reforms. This was the strongest card in Pétain's hand, and it is a tragedy that the so-called National Revolution has been carried out by defeatists

* *The Government of Vichy.* By Lt.-Col. Pierre Tissier. Harrap. 15s.

and reactionaries and for the most part in the wrong way. The larger part of this extremely instructive book deals with the actual work of the Vichy Government and is based on official material. There are chapters on the strengthening of the State, the population problem, unemployment, the return to the land, planned economy, the monetary and banking system, taxes, controls and prices. Some excellent things have been done, we are told, particularly with regard to the protection of the family.

"Where political considerations do not have to be brought into play it cannot be doubted that desirable reforms have been effected or attempted." Yet the experiment taken as a whole is pronounced a failure, for it has been concerned and applied in the wrong spirit. We listen to the voice of Pétain, but we detect the hand of Hitler. That agriculture is the foundation of French prosperity is an axiom, but industry has also played an important part. That Hitler desires to see France growing food and buying the products of German industry is no sufficient reason for upsetting the balance and reducing her standard of life. France has too long and fine a tradition of liberty to feed tamely and permanently out of the German hand, as Pétain, Darlan and Laval desire; everyone knows that the men of Vichy will be swept away the moment the military tide turns. After his elaborate survey of the situation the author declares that the policy of collaboration is an absolute failure so far as visible results for France are concerned, and that the internal policy of Vichy is gradually leading the country to a final catastrophe. "To-day France is in a state of masked revolt. The Vichy Government no longer represents France. The whole of France is behind de Gaulle." Colonel Tissier leaves his readers sorrowful, but not discouraged. France soon pulled herself together after 1871, and she will surely do so again, carrying through necessary reforms without outraging either the patriotism or the liberalism of a great people.

G. P. G.

MEN AND WOMEN.*

When a gifted writer with an insight into psychology states her views on the subject "Of Men and Women," a highly stimulating account may be expected. And this is indeed found in Pearl Buck's challenging and controversial book. Sometimes one may feel that she overstates her case in order to elicit strong reactions, on other occasions that her stay in China has made her rather unfair to American life. For is it not true to say, as Folsom and other American sociologists have pointed out, that the previous happiness of a marriage is not altered by the fact of an ultimate divorce, and that the frequent occurrence of couples remarrying shows that they have been disappointed in their own experiment, rather than in their evaluation of marriage? Furthermore, women, although not having the same amount of domestic work to perform in the United States as in non-industrial countries, still fulfil vital tasks in their homes, especially since the lack of domestic help forces them to undertake duties previously relegated to servants. It is not so much the amount as the distribution of work that has altered, since women, instead of working in other people's houses, cater now for their own and their families' requirements, thus contributing to a democratisation of the household in a significant manner. In these connections Pearl Buck's valuations seem far too gloomy. On the other hand she is perfectly right in stating that the woman with marked domestic capabilities, or especially gifted for professional work, has a clear-cut career open to her, whereas the "problem women," who feel no distinctive urge in one or the other direction, face a difficult situation at a time of crisis and revaluation of Western standards. That difficulties arise which were hidden in the past in the more static Eastern civilisations is perfectly true, but the violent urge towards freedom now expressed by Indian and Chinese women shows that discontent existed, and only waited for an opportunity to assert itself. Mrs. Buck's emphasis on

* *Of Men and Women*. By Pearl Buck. Methuen. 6s.

the importance of education appears most vital and stimulating, and her clear elucidation of what Fascism means to women is a timely warning, since many women in the Allied countries have not yet fully realised the issues at stake and the part they will have to play in the planning of the future.

HELEN ROSENAU.

THE WAR ON THE CIVIL AND MILITARY FRONTS.*

This an interesting and valuable series of lectures which rises to sheer excellence in its conclusion. This deals primarily with civil defence, and the author as Deputy-Regional Commissioner, South Western Region, is lecturing on matters concerning which he has first-hand knowledge. His comments are shrewd, his suggestions wise, and he is particularly to be thanked for his courage in exposing the fake-secrecy which does so much to handicap our civil defence in some of its most vital aspects. His touch is not so happy in dealing with events in France and Flanders concerning which he is dependent upon reports from others. Closely associated himself first with machine-guns, and then with tanks, his pardonable enthusiasm for these, his own specialities, tends here and there to distort his judgment. Stress is laid upon Cambrai, November 20th, 1917, as introducing a revolutionary mode of attack, but no mention is made of the parallel revolution in artillery tactics, "predicted" firing, which alone made Cambrai possible. Nor is there mention of the German counter-attack only ten days later which robbed us of all the gains of Cambrai. There are historical inaccuracies, and some over-hasty generalisations. The Battle of Trafalgar was not fought in the Mediterranean, and had no connection with events in that region. The use of such phrasing as "the tank, the master-weapon for ground warfare," is unfortunate. The tank played no rôle of "master-weapon" in Malaya or Burma; and consider such episodes as have repeatedly happened in Libya and Russia, in which tanks had to attack over heavily mined or obstacle-filled areas. To enable them to get forward, infantry was needed to clear the way, and these infantry needed cover, whether from guns or dive-bombers. Which was here the "master-weapon"? Guns, infantry, aircraft, or tanks? Surely the truth is that all were equally important, and that the failure of the one element spelt ruin to the others.

The statement, "The Germans adopted wholeheartedly the doctrine of armoured warfare," is merely a repetition of other people's fallacies, for it leaves out the great care and immense resources devoted by the Germans to the development of infantry, artillery and air means and tactics. The author scarcely devotes sufficient attention to the rôle of artillery in the present war. He seems to think that the phenomena of 1916-17, in which prolonged artillery bombardments upset the drainage system, producing mud and shell-holes, obstacles in themselves to infantry attack, are bound to be repeated. But in the short but intense bombardments of 1918 neither mud nor shell-holes played any part either with ourselves or with the Germans. The use of vast numbers of guns and immense quantities of ammunition is inevitable in modern war, and it is disquieting to find so little thought taken as to the possibilities of revolutionary developments in "predicted" firing.

The author is too hasty in maintaining the collapse of the German offensive, March 21st, 1918, as due to "lack of mobility." Lack of man-power is the more reasonable explanation. Our own subsequent counter-offensive was backed up by 2 million fresh American troops. Nineteen-eighteen would have been a different story had Ludendorff been able to draw upon similar untapped resources. This book, interesting and thoughtful, suggests that in our absorption with enemy means and methods successful yesterday, we may omit to study and reflect on the means and methods he may use to-morrow. That way lies disaster.

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

* *The War on the Civil and Military Fronts.* By Major-General G. M. Lindsay. Cambridge University Press. 5s.

One function of the painter is that of bringing colour into our lives, and in this sense Alva may rightly be regarded as a painter (*Alva*, by Maurice Collis ; John Lane, The Bodley Head, 2 gns.). Nothing can perhaps illustrate this fact better than the contrast between two of his works, the *Exodus* and *A Rose*, painted on the same day in 1938 but in entirely different moods. The one shows the plight of the Jews, lasting, as the artist thinks, now for about 4,000 years. Its colouring is mournfully sober, mainly based on bluish greens and other subdued tones. The other shows the brightly red flower sparkling against its blue background. In both cases the painting conveys the mood of the painter, and it seems characteristic of the essentially balanced personality of Alva that he had to counteract the poignant and emotional colour scheme of the first picture by its very opposite, thus regaining his poise. This width of individual approach allows him to show Rachel's Tomb with an isolated palm tree bowing, as it were, towards it, done with a few strokes of black against the unlimited space of a white background. A sort of whimsical humour permeates this drawing and may be equally found in the festive array of a timeless *Coronation* showing no king or queen, but the golden coach of all children's fairy dreams. The excellent reproductions in the book on *Alva*, edited by Mr. Maurice Collis, who has contributed a sympathetic introduction to the "œuvre," cannot match the quality of the originals, in particular the tonality based on the underlying tints. But even so they give an insight not only in the artist's compositions but also in his technique of painting. The actual strokes of the brush can be recognised, and the main impressions of his works are transmitted. For those not familiar with the originals as well as for art lovers who have been able to see the works themselves, the book represents a valuable record. It is difficult to fit Alva into any fixed category of style. He represents his own ideals of craftsmanship, based on studies from nature but transposed by his own fecund imagination. The works are completed in the studio, not in the open air, a fact which may well give them their dream-like quality. "How far is this art Jewish"? is an obvious question. The answer may lie in the spirituality of approach, the almost abstract ornamentalism of Alva's colouring and in his peculiar humour, which rings with a note of sadness. It is not so much the employment of Jewish motives which is characteristic, although these abound in his work, but rather his temperament, which makes him choose—in the sense of Zola's theory—a particular aspect of nature.

HELEN ROSENAU.

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In all her works Virginia Woolf gives her readers surprises. Things happen that happen in no other writer's works, and so she wove about herself a halo, a sort of fairy story, through which her readers peered to see a half-mystical figure, something hardly belonging to this world. But again comes a surprise. E. M. Forster, in a thoroughly honest picture (*Virginia Woolf*, by E. M. Forster ; Cambridge University Press, 1s. 6d.), reveals her not as a legendary figure but as a very human personality. "She was full of interests, and the number increased as she grew older ; she was curious about life," he writes, "and she was tough, sensitive but tough." Foremost in her life was her love of writing ; she "liked writing with an intensity," and, moreover, she liked writing for fun ; "her pen amused her, and in the midst of writing seriously, this other delight would spurt forth." She who had "an insatiable honesty" and a passion for truth would be grateful to E. M. Forster for this honest tribute to herself, for a tribute it indeed is. When he had the Rede Lectureship conferred upon him, "the greatest honour I have ever received," he writes, "I wondered whether I could not transmit some honour to her from the University she so admired." Anything coming from the sensitive pen of E. M. Forster is always a delight and a satisfaction.

THEODORA ROSCOE.